NEW JERSEY’S CONSTITUTIONAL RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT FOR STATE LEGISLATURE CANDIDATES: A ROADMAP FOR CHALLENGERS AND A CRY FOR REFORM DURING RE-DISTRICTING YEARS*

By: Kevin R. Miller**

I. INTRODUCTION

New Jersey’s constitution provides, in article IV, section 1, paragraph 2, that “[n]o person shall be a member of the Senate who shall not . . . have been a citizen and resident of the State for four years, and of the district for which he shall be elected one year, next before his election.”1 Additionally, “[n]o person shall be a member of the General Assembly who shall not . . . have been a citizen and resident of the State for two years, and of the district for which he shall be elected one year, next before his election.”2 For over a decade, however, the New Jersey Attorney General3 and the Secretary of State4 have been barred from

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1. N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 1, ¶ 2.
2. Id.
3. Under New Jersey’s constitution, the Attorney General “shall be nominated and appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate to serve during the term of office of the Governor.” N.J. CONST. art. V, § 4, ¶ 3.
4. Under New Jersey’s constitution, the Secretary of State “shall be nominated and appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate to serve during the term of office of the Governor, except the Governor may appoint the Lieutenant Governor to serve as Secretary of State without the advice and consent of the Senate.” Id. New Jersey statutory law further provides that the Secretary of State “is designated the chief State
enforcing this constitutional provision due to a federal district court’s injunction in Robertson v. Bartels (Robertson I). Robertson I concluded that the one-year-in-district residency requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause under a strict scrutiny analysis because it impeded on the fundamental right of “persons to run for public office [combined with] the right of voters to vote for candidates of their choice.” Thereafter, New Jersey Attorneys General and Secretaries of State relied on this opinion when supervising and enforcing the state’s election process, and allowed candidates to pursue and succeed in becoming elected to public office without meeting the in-district requirement.

In recent years, however, the injunction proved artificial in plugging the flow of litigation stemming from the provision. Prior to November 8, 2011—Election Day—the provision succeeded in keeping Olympic gold-medalist Carl Lewis from running for State Senate in New Jersey’s Eighth Legislative District. In Lewis v. Guadagno, perhaps the highest-profile state legislative race in the country, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit denied Mr. Lewis’s bid to run in part

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8. Lewis v. Guadagno, 445 F. App’x 599 (3d Cir. 2011); see infra Section III-B for further analysis.

9. National news coverage of the race included the Associated Press, the New York Times, the Philadelphia Inquirer, the Wall Street Journal, the Huffington Post, the Los Angeles Times, CNN, ESPN, and various local media outlets.
because he had not resided in the state for the requisite four years. After Election Day 2011, the provision struck again via the New Jersey Supreme Court, which invalidated the election of Gabriela Mosquera to the General Assembly in In re Contest of November 8, 2011 General Election of Office of New Jersey General Assembly due to the fact that she had not lived in the Fourth Legislative District for the requisite one year. The facts of the case made the decision more complex because Ms. Mosquera moved to her new residence during 2011—a year in which legislative re-districting occurred—affecting which municipalities constituted the Fourth Legislative District. This drew a lengthy dissent from Chief Justice Stuart Rabner, who objected to the requirement's application to candidates during re-districting years.

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Thereafter, the New Jersey Attorney General petitioned the district court to annul the Robertson I injunction, citing the In re Contest decision for support. Various groups intervened, seeking to modify the scope of the original injunction, rather than annul it, in light of In re Contest. In a caustic opinion, Judge Dickinson Debevoise concluded not only that the durational residency requirement was again invalid under a strict scrutiny analysis, but also that In re Contest was an “improper collateral attack” by a state court on the district court's original injunction in Robertson I. At the interveners' behest, however, the court narrowed the scope of the injunction to preclude enforcement of the one-year-in-

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10. Lewis, 445 F. App'x at 602-04.
12. Following the 2011 re-districting process, the municipalities that make up New Jersey's Fourth Legislative District now consist of: Chesilhurst, Clementon, Gloucester Township, Laurel Springs, Lindenwold, Monroe (Gloucester County), Pitman, Washington (Gloucester County), and Winslow. See Districts by Number, supra note 7.
13. In re Contest, 40 A.3d at 713.
14. See Districts by Number, supra note 7.
15. In re Contest, 40 A.3d at 714 (Rabner, C.J., dissenting).
18. These intervening groups included the New Jersey Democratic State Committee, the Communications Workers of America (CWA), the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), the Latino Action Network, the Latino Coalition of Monmouth County, the Latinos United for Political Empowerment Political Action Committee, and the Women's Political Caucus of New Jersey. See id. at 519.
19. Id. at 533.
20. Id. at 528.
district requirement “only during years where the state undergoes legislative re-apportionment.” 21

This Note seeks to comment on this recent flow of litigation stemming from the New Jersey Constitution’s residency requirements for candidates for public office: Robertson I, Lewis, In re Contest, and Robertson II. In so doing, I revisit the history of the New Jersey residency requirement in its constitution and in its court system. I then critique how modern cases have worked in tandem, and to each others’ detriment, and argue that, during re-districting years, the one-year-in-district residency requirement clashes with re-districting in a manner that violates equal protection: allowing the requirement to oust political enemies via the hands of the unelected. Candidates whose residency is challenged during these years will likely be able to prevail against such claims within the court system—especially those whose resident municipalities are re-districted into another district, and who seek to move their residence into the newly-formed district, the majority of which they formerly represented. However, I argue that during other years where re-districting is not an issue, the requirement still serves the non-violative purpose it has served since 1776: allowing voters to become familiar with a candidate, as well as allowing the candidate to become familiar with voters. I conclude that the New Jersey Legislature should seek to abolish the one-year residency requirement during re-districting years, and that otherwise, candidates may bring valid challenges to the requirement, provided they meet the specific circumstances of what I deem a “perfected claim.”

II. HISTORY OF NEW JERSEY’S RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT

By the time New Jersey enacted its first constitution—the New Jersey Constitution of 1776—the state’s Legislature was bicameral: composed of an upper-chamber Legislative Council 22 and a lower-chamber Assembly. 23 Article III of the New Jersey constitution of 1776

21. Id. at 534.
22. During the Constitutional Convention of 1844, the name “Legislative Council” was replaced with “Senate,” which was then implemented in the New Jersey Constitution of 1844. See New Jersey Writers’ Project of the Work Projects Administration, Proceedings of the New Jersey State Constitutional Convention of 1844 (1942) [hereinafter Proceedings], available at http://catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/006252168; N.J. Const. of 1844, art. IV, § 1, cl. 1 (amended 1947). The term “Senate” is used to this day to refer to New Jersey’s upper-chamber legislative body. See N.J. Const. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1.
23. N.J. Const. of 1776, art. IV, § 1 (amended 1844).
spelled out, in relevant part, the residency time-period qualification for candidates for those legislative offices:

That on the said second Tuesday in October, yearly and every year forever\textsuperscript{24} . . . the counties\textsuperscript{25} shall severally choose one person to be a member of the [L]egislative [C]ouncil of this [C]olony, who shall be and have been, for one whole year next before the election, an inhabitant and freeholder in the county in which he is chosen . . . that, at the same time, each county shall also choose three members of [A]ssembly; provided, that no person shall be entitled to a seat in the said [A]ssembly, unless he be and have been, for one whole year next before the election, an inhabitant of the county he is to represent . . . \textsuperscript{26}

Thus, the people who sought election to either house “must have been inhabitants of the Colony and of the county from which chosen ‘for one whole year next before the election,’” meaning for one year prior to the particular year’s election day, which occurred annually.\textsuperscript{27} This appears to be the first instance that a time period baseline was applied to a voting district residency requirement for legislative candidates in New Jersey.\textsuperscript{28}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[24] Thus, elections for the Legislative Council and Assembly were held annually. \textit{Id.} at art. III. In his Princeton University dissertation, Charles Erdman qualifies the importance of annual elections as the “\textit{sine qua non} of political liberty” in the minds of the framers of the New Jersey Constitution of 1776. CHARLES R. ERDMAN, JR., \textit{THE NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTION OF 1776} 57 (1929). Furthermore, as such a provision was not included in prior colonial governments, Erdman concludes that “its selection by the author of the new constitution must have been due to contemporary political theory rather than to \textit{c}olonial precedent.” \textit{Id.}
\item[25] Via this provision, voting districts consisted of the then-contemporaneous New Jersey counties. N.J. \textit{CONST.} of 1776, art. III.
\item[26] \textit{Id.} (emphasis added). Erdman notes that the in-county inhabitancy qualification present in New Jersey’s 1776 Constitution was “attained by usage and not by law in the Federal House of Representatives.” ERDMAN, supra note 24, at 53 n.56.
\item[27] \textit{Id.} at 53 (quoting N.J. \textit{CONST.} of 1776, art. III).
\item[28] Previous qualifications for candidates for public office prior to the New Jersey Constitution of 1776 were considered more lenient, and if residency was included in the qualifications, it included no time period. See \textit{Id.} at 54. For example, in the \textit{Royal Charter of New Jersey of 1664}, “\textit{Assemblmen and Councillors . . . were simply to be ‘freemen,’ subject to and subscribing allegiance to, the King of England.” \textit{Id.} After the Colony was split into East and West Jersey, the unicameral West Jersey required Assemblymen to be “\textit{Proprietors or Freeholders}” as of 1677—Freeholders referring to county governing officials. \textit{Id.} Conversely, the bicameral East Jersey required Councillors and Assemblymen to be “\textit{Planters or Inhabitants}” residing within the Province per the “\textit{Fundamental Constitutions}” of East Jersey of 1683. \textit{Id.} Finally, when the Colony was whole, the “\textit{Commissiones}” and “\textit{Instructions}” to the Royal Governors dictated that, from 1702–1776, Assemblymen were to
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The requirement was tailored specifically so that Councillors and Assemblymen would be entitled to suffrage—a requirement that is expressly provided for in later constitutions. Furthermore, the qualifications were generally based on previous colonial government and the prevailing political thought of the era. In the next constitutional revision—the New Jersey Constitution of 1844—the framers saw fit to change and break up the residency qualifications for legislative office within the constitution. Article IV, section 1, clauses 1 and 2 now provided for these qualifications:

The legislative power shall be vested in a [S]enate and [G]eneral [A]ssembly . . . . No person shall be a member of the Senate who shall not . . . have been a citizen and inhabitant of the state for four years, and of the county for which he shall be chosen one year, next before his election; and no person shall be a member of the General Assembly who shall not . . . have been a citizen and inhabitant of the state for two years, and of the county for which he shall be chosen one year, next before his election; provided, that no person shall be eligible as a member of either house of the [L]egislature, who shall not be entitled to the right of suffrage . . . .

be freeholders owning one-thousand acres within the division from which chosen, while Councillors could simply be appointed from the county’s “Principle Freeholders.” Id.

29. Article IV of the New Jersey Constitution of 1776 provided that in order to be eligible to vote, among other things, inhabitants of the Colony must “have resided within the [c]ounty in which they claim a vote for twelve months immediately preceding the election,” which paralleled the one-year provision for Councillors and Assemblymen. N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. IV. The state’s current constitution now expressly provides that “no person shall be eligible for membership in the Legislature unless he be entitled to the right of suffrage.” N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 2.

30. ERDMAN, supra note 24, at 54, 55. Erdman states that the precedents for these qualifications, including the residency requirement, “are to be found in the earlier government of the Colony.” Id. at 54. Additionally, the qualifications were “founded upon well-known constitutional precedents” and kept “with the political theory and practice of the time.” Id. at 55.

31. At the time, in order to be eligible to vote, the requirements to do so included, among other things, residence within the state for one year, and residence in the county one sought to vote in for five months prior to the election. N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. IV, §§ 1–3 (emphasis added).
Members of the Senate and General Assembly shall be elected yearly and every year, on the second Tuesday of October . . . .

Thus, the New Jersey Constitution of 1844 now required Senators to have lived in the state for four years, and within their respective counties for one year prior to their election. Assemblymen were required to have lived within the state for two years, and within their respective counties for one year prior to their election. It is significant that members of the Legislature at this juncture were now expressly required to have the right to suffrage, as it provided for the principles behind residency requirements: that elected officials would have the opportunity to observe the state’s laws, its institutions, and its form of government—even more so than the average citizen eligible to vote. At the Proceedings of the New Jersey State Constitutional Convention of 1844, there was very little debate on the subject of residency qualifications after the amendment “on the Qualification of Persons To Be Elected” had been introduced from the “Committee on the Right of Suffrage.” There was some discussion on whether to “strike out the word inhabitant, and insert resident” and whether to “add the word resident,” but such motions were voted down. A motion to “require a person to have been a citizen of the

32. N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. IV, § 1. Delegate Thompson via the “Committee on the Right of Suffrage” first proposed the changes to this article at the New Jersey State Constitutional Convention of 1844 on May 16, 1844. See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22, at 39–40.

33. N.J. CONST. of 1844, art IV, § 2, cl. 2.

34. Id.

35. See N.J. CONST. of 1844, art. IV, § 1, cl. 2. In his proceedings debate, Delegate Ogden stated that “[t]he object of [one] year’s residence is that no one shall be qualified to vote until he is identified in feelings, principles and occupation with the citizens of N[ew] Jersey for one year.” PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22, at 81. Delegate Field later remarked that the residency period for suffrage rights was so “that [citizens] may have an opportunity to observe our laws, our institutions, and our form of government.” Id. at 85. Thus, it stands to reason that since the framers saw fit to expressly place the right to suffrage in the requirements for public office, the principles behind providing residency requirements for members of the Legislature stemmed in part from the principles behind residency requirements for suffrage rights. It is telling that the right to suffrage was taken up at the same time as the qualifications of persons to be elected.


37. Id. at 99–101. This debate centered around whether the terms “resident” and “inhabitant” were synonymous for purposes of being elected to office. See id. However, the motion was voted down after the remarks of Delegate Vroom, who concluded that it was well understood in the law that “[t]he terms are synonymous, and . . . we had better not make a distinction between them.” Id. at 100–01.
United States for [ten] years before he [could] be elected to Council.\textsuperscript{38} was also voted down.

Interestingly, in the New Jersey Constitution of 1844, Senators\textsuperscript{39} continued to be elected as one-per-county for three-year terms.\textsuperscript{40} However, Assembly seats were now “apportioned among the said [c]ounties as nearly as may be according to the number of their inhabitants.”\textsuperscript{41} This apportionment took into account the recently-created United States Census,\textsuperscript{42} and provided that, after every ten years when the census was taken, the counties’ Assembly seats would be re-apportioned to provide proper representation to any population shifts.\textsuperscript{43} Each county was “at all times . . . entitled to one [Assembly] member; and the whole number of members [was to] never exceed sixty.”\textsuperscript{44} This was the first time that the New Jersey Constitution included express language about census apportionment with regard to its elected officials and municipalities, something that would serve to provoke litigation in future constitutions.\textsuperscript{45}

In the most recent constitutional convention, which occurred in 1947, the residency requirements went unchanged, except that the word

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\bibitem{38} Id. at 109. This motion was introduced by Delegate Elmer, who believed that ten years—a longer period of time than originally proposed—was proper to ensure that an elected official “understood the nature of our institutions and laws, and what could suit the wishes and wants of the people.” Id. Further conclusive of the point that the principles behind the right to suffrage mirrored those behind the qualifications for elected office, Delegate Ogden immediately remarked that such “principle[s] had already been decided,” and the motion was “not agreed to.” Id. at 110.
\bibitem{39} The constitution of 1844 was the first New Jersey Constitution to change the term “Legislative Council” to “Senate” and thus the term “Councillor” changed to “Senator.” See N.J. Const. of 1844, art. IV, § 1, cl. 1; \textit{see also} PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22, at 110–11 (“Mr. Vroom having stated that the Committee on the Legislative Department had agreed to recommend the names of ‘Senate’ and ‘General Assembly,’ the [a]mendment was agreed to.”).
\bibitem{40} See N.J. Const. of 1844, art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
\bibitem{41} Id. at § 3, cl. 1.
\bibitem{42} The first United States Census was carried out in 1790, but the Census Act of 1840 authorized the establishment of a centralized census office during each enumeration, which obviously was on the minds of the framers of the New Jersey Constitution of 1844. See 1790 Overview, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/overview/1790.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2012); 1840 Overview, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/history/www/through_the_decades/overview/1840.html (last visited Dec. 29, 2012).
\bibitem{43} See N.J. Const. of 1844, art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. Mr. Vroom via the “Committee on the Legislative Department” first proposed this as a part of the New Jersey Constitution of 1844 on May 28, 1844. See PROCEEDINGS, supra note 22, at 111–12.
\bibitem{44} See N.J. Const. of 1844, art. IV, § 3, cl. 1.
\bibitem{45} See \textit{infra} Sections III-A, III-D for further analysis.
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“inhabitant” was changed to “resident.” Indeed, the proceedings for the residency requirements for Senate and General Assembly read as follows:

Section I . . . Paragraph 2—1st clause: The Committee was of the opinion that the qualifications for a member of the Senate should be retained as presently set forth in the Constitution, with the exception that the word “inhabitant” should be changed to “resident”; and Mr. Jorgenson felt that a Senator should be a resident of the State for at least ten years.

2nd clause: The Committee was of the opinion that the present qualifications for membership in the House of Assembly should be retained, with the exception that the word “inhabitant” should be changed to “resident”; and Mr. Jorgenson felt that the qualifications for residence in the State for a member of the Assembly should be five years.

In 1947, New Jersey voters overwhelmingly ratified the constitution prescribed by the Convention of 1947, as well as the residency requirement that went with it, and the constitution took effect in 1948.

Subsequently, however, the United States Supreme Court in *Reynolds v. Sims* changed the provision by announcing that “seats in both houses of a bicameral [S]tate [L]egislature must be apportioned on a population basis.” Thereafter, on May 10, 1965, a statute was enacted that provided for a new Constitutional Convention to be convened in 1966 to address reapportionment, in part to address how reapportionment was to affect the qualifications of Legislators. Ultimately, the constitution was amended in 1966 to prescribe re-apportionment of legislative districts with the decennial census, doing away with the former county system of representation. This is what ultimately became article IV, section 2, paragraphs 1 and 3.

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47. *Id.*
50. *Id.* at 568.
53. N.J. Const. art. IV, § 2, ¶¶ 1, 3.
However, nowhere in the Proceedings did the Convention of 1966 drafters mention a change to the residency requirement; rather, the change in the language of the residency requirement—replacing “county” with “district”—came as a result of the Committee on Arrangement and Style’s draft of “Proposal Number 45.”\textsuperscript{54} The Committee on Arrangement and Style was utilized during the Constitutional Convention of 1966 in order to make the proper arrangement of language for the amendment, however, the Committee was not authorized “to change the sense or purpose of any proposal referred to it.”\textsuperscript{55} Therefore, the framers of the constitutional amendment neither debated, discussed, nor even referred to the residency requirement’s change—by extension, the voters’ subsequent ratification did not take into account this change either.

III. **Litigation Challenging Residency Requirements**

A. *Litigation in New Jersey*

Residency requirements for elected officials in New Jersey have a litigious history at both the state and local level. In 1951, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in *Stothers v. Martini*,\textsuperscript{56} held that residency requirements prescribed for local officials by the State Legislature under the Walsh Act,\textsuperscript{57} which consisted of being “a citizen and resident of the municipality for at least two years immediately preceding his election, or [having] voted in such municipality at the two general elections immediately preceding his election[,]” were constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment.\textsuperscript{58} *Stothers* found that since this requirement was statutory in nature, rather than drawn from the constitution, and as the constitution did not provide an “inherent right to be elected or appointed to office or public position, it is appropriate for the appropriate law-making body to prescribe reasonable qualifications.”\textsuperscript{59} Interestingly, the *Stothers* court saw fit to note that:

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\item[56.] 79 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1951).
\item[57.] Walsh Act, 1948 N.J. Laws 82 (codified as amended N.J. Rev. Stat. § 40:72-1 (1948)). It is worth noting that the citizenship and residency requirements under the Walsh Act were later amended by the State Legislature. See S.B. 1282, 1980 Leg. (N.J. 1980).
\item[58.] *Stothers*, 79 A.2d at 860.
\item[59.] Id. at 859 (emphasis added).
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Indeed, the [New Jersey] Constitution itself by providing residence requirements for key officers in State government has enunciated the principle that the persons who are to make and execute the laws of the State should have a substantial period of residence in this State in order to familiarize themselves with its conditions and needs.\(^60\)

In a similar case, *Gangemi v. Rosengard*,\(^61\) the New Jersey Supreme Court held that the Faulkner Act’s requirements for local officials, which included a two-year residency requirement and a two-year voter registration requirement, were unconstitutional due to the requirement of voter registration.\(^62\) However, the *Gangemi* court differentiated the facts from *Stothers*, and once again reiterated the aforementioned *Stothers* language on the constitutionality and principles behind residency requirements on the state and local levels.\(^63\) The *Gangemi* court further asserted that the “citizenship and residence” requirements for state officials “offer evidence respectively of . . . loyalty, and either an acquaintance with local problems or a stake in their solution.”\(^64\)

Seemingly, however, the first time that the New Jersey courts took up a direct challenge to the residency requirement for State Legislators was in *Ammond v. Keating*.\(^65\) In *Ammond*, the appellate division of the New Jersey Superior Court dealt with a prospective candidate for State Senate in the Sixth Senatorial District who, undisputedly, had not been a resident of the district for the requisite year.\(^66\) The defendant asserted that the requirement was offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment, and the trial court agreed.\(^67\) The appellate division disagreed with the trial

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\(^{60}\) *Id.* at 860. This language is strikingly similar to that of the framers of the 1844 constitution when referencing the principles behind the right to suffrage, and by extension, the principles behind the qualifications to be elected to public office. *See supra* note 35.

\(^{61}\) 207 A.2d 665 (N.J. 1965).

\(^{62}\) *Id.* at 668–69.

\(^{63}\) *Id.* at 668.

\(^{64}\) *Id.* at 669. This language is an addition of the *Stothers* language, and a reaffirmation of the principles asserted by the framers of the New Jersey Constitution of 1947.


\(^{66}\) *Id.* at 499. The plaintiff-appellant was an incumbent State Senator from the Sixth Senatorial District who was running against the defendant-appellee in the Democratic Primary of 1977. *Id.; see also* N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 2. It is of note that 1977 was not a re-districting year, and the requirement was not challenged on such a basis.

\(^{67}\) *Ammond*, 374 A.2d at 498–99. The trial court held that “the right to seek elective office is a fundamental right necessitating application of the so-called ‘compelling interest’ test to determine its constitutional validity” and proceeded to strike down the requirement
court, however, relying upon precedent, including United States Supreme Court precedent, which upheld residency requirements in other states.\textsuperscript{68} It should be noted, however, there is a difference between the Supreme Court precedent—upholding \textit{in-state} residency requirements—and \textit{Ammond}, which upheld an \textit{in-district} residency requirement.\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Ammond} emphasized that precedent, including the \textit{Stothers} decision, provided that “the one-year district residency requirement . . . at least bears a rational relation to legitimate state goals,” and upheld its constitutionality.\textsuperscript{70}

In \textit{Matthews v. City of Atlantic City},\textsuperscript{71} a Walsh Act case concerning a candidacy for the office of City Commissioner, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that a two-year residency requirement for such public offices\textsuperscript{72} violated equal protection.\textsuperscript{73} The \textit{Matthews} court asserted new and important language regarding the principles behind residency requirements:

\begin{quote}
[A] durational residency requirement is directed at maintaining the integrity of the ballot by preventing fraudulent and frivolous candidacies. It ensures that candidates have some knowledge of local affairs and, conversely, that local voters have an opportunity to learn about a candidate to intelligently assess his fitness for office. Properly drawn, a
\end{quote}

by “[f]inding no compelling state interest” to justify its imposition. \textit{Id.} at 499. Thus, defendant-appellee’s name was “ordered placed on the primary election ballot.” \textit{Id.}


70. \textit{Ammond}, 374 A.2d at 499–500.

71. \textit{Id.} at 1011 (1980).

72. The requirement provided that in a Walsh Act municipality, which is run by a board of commissioners, “the elected governing body, ‘shall have been a citizen and resident of the municipality for at least two years immediately preceding his election.’” \textit{Id.} at 1012.

73. \textit{Id.} at 1012–13. The challengers of the particular provision had brought suit under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. \textit{Id.} at 1012.
durational residency requirement is directed at providing a sufficient period of time for these two “educational” functions to take place.74

However, the court chose not to resolve “whether a two-year residency requirement passes constitutional muster” and instead decided the case on narrow grounds tailored to the requirements as they related to the Walsh Act.75 Interestingly, in his concurring opinion, Justice Mark A. Sullivan argued for a different approach in striking down the residency requirement:

[I]n this day and age a two-year period no longer subserves the purpose of a residency requirement as outlined in Stothers v. Martini . . . . In 1911, when the Walsh Act was originally enacted, the pace of life was slower, means of transportation and travel were not what they are today and persons did not change their residences as frequently as they do at the present time. The increasing transience of the average individual today, however, calls for reconsideration of extended residency requirements such as the one here involved. I would hold that a two-year period, such as the Walsh Act calls for, is unduly burdensome and restrictive.76

Justice Sullivan’s acknowledgement that residency requirements may have lost their purpose in modern governance underscored what would be a litigious future for such requirements in New Jersey.

74. Id. at 1020. This again mirrors, if not adds to, the principles behind residency requirements found in the New Jersey Constitution.

75. Id. at 1022. The Matthews court decided that any “justifications for the residency requirement [within the Walsh Act] . . . lose meaning when it is observed that the statute applies to only [forty] out of 567 municipalities in the State with commission form of government.” Id. (citing FITZGERALD, LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 891–904 (1980)). Thus, because “[t]he vast majority of municipalities have no durational residency requirement for candidacy,” the court decided that the facts of the case could not escape the similar rationale and tenets of the Gangemi decision—there was no showing that “an additional two years [was] reasonably necessary for a candidate to become familiar with local problems or for the voters to become familiar with the candidate.” Id. at 1022. The court harshly pointed out that “[n]o other justification for this distinction has been advanced, nor does one exist.” Id. Therefore, the court concluded that the provision was offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. Id.

76. Id. at 1022–23 (Sullivan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Sullivan did not, however, believe that there was an equal protection basis for invalidating the residency requirement at issue in Matthews. Id. Sullivan reasoned that this was because the electorate of Atlantic City had repeatedly voted to continue their governance under the Walsh Act. Id.
B. Critical Residency Problems and Solutions Elsewhere

The relevant state and federal litigation that has occurred over the years makes it evident that a clear trend is emerging that may eventually be taken head-on by the Supreme Court. Specifically, residency requirements that offer a number of years of voting-district residency pose a myriad of problems that cause them to be struck down—particularly during re-districting years—and mirror real issues in New Jersey. However, residency requirements that offer a number of years of state residency are consistently upheld.

In Wenke v. Hitchcock, the California Supreme Court unanimously held that, when an elector of the First Supervisorial District had his resident municipality moved from his original political district via re-districting—and, by extension, he himself was removed from the vast number of constituents he had served for eighteen years—he was entitled to candidacy after relocating back into his original district before the next election, and a one-year residency requirement was not applicable to him. In fact, the Wenke court found that:

78. Supervisors are elected officers of the county government in California, with numerous individual political district boundaries depending on the county. See, e.g., Orange County Supervisorial Districts, OC ALMANAC, http://www.ocalmanac.com/Government/g101a.htm#5Dist (last visited Aug. 19, 2014).
79. Wenke, 493 P.2d at 1157–58. The re-districting process in Wenke culminated in October of 1971 with a re-districting ordinance known as “Government Code section 25001,” which provided that:

[following each decennial federal census, and using the census as a basis, the board shall adjust the boundaries of any or all of the supervisorial districts of the county so that the districts shall be as nearly equal in population as may be. In establishing the boundaries of the districts the board may give consideration to the following factors: (a) topography, (b) geography, (c) cohesiveness, continuity, integrity, and compactness of territory, and (d) community of interests of the districts.

Id. at 1156 n.1. At that time, an election for Supervisor in the First Supervisorial District was planned for 1972—the following year—due to the expiration of the incumbent’s regular term of office. Id. at 1156. However, due to re-districting, Petitioner’s resident municipality, along with those of 3,000 other residents, was moved into the Fourth Supervisorial District, where the next election for Supervisor was not planned until 1974 due to staggered elections. Id. The residency requirement in question required that “to qualify for election as a member of the board of supervisors, a candidate ‘shall have been an elector of the district which he represents for at least one year immediately preceding his election . . . .’” Id. at 1157–58.
the purpose of the residency requirement would be promoted by permitting a candidate who, prior to his removal therefrom by a redistricting enactment, has resided in a given district for the necessary period of time to run for office in his former district providing he relocates his residence within its boundaries. 80

Thus, an unfortunate candidate in these situations was held to be able to apply his previous period of residence to his new or old Supervisory District during re-districting years. 81 However, should the candidate choose to move back into his former district, he had to “relocate his residence in his former district by moving it to a location” that remained within its boundaries. 82

In perhaps the landmark case foreshadowing others to come, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in Martin v. Jones 83 upheld the candidacy of two delegates over a one-year-in-district requirement. 84 The delegates showed an intention to move back into their original district after their respective municipalities were re-districted out, 85 due to a legislative re-apportionment 86 that occurred less than one year prior

80. Id. at 1159–61. The Wenke court reasoned, based on the rationale behind residency requirements, that to ensure “a reasonable knowledge by a proposed candidate of the general requirements of his [constituency]][,]” it made sense for Petitioner to be allowed to relocate back in order to run as a candidate where he was familiar with local problems and needs. Id. at 1160 (alteration in original) (quoting Zeilenga v. Nelson, 484 P.2d 578 (Cal. 1971)). Petitioner would certainly be as familiar “as the candidate who by [sheer good luck] remains in the district unaffected by the change in boundaries.” Id. at 1160. Furthermore, the court went so far as to suggest that “indeed it may thwart the democratic process to insist that he may run only in his new district,” which would be totally unfamiliar to him, and vice-versa. Id.

81. Id.
82. Id.
84. The one-year-in-district residency requirement at issue in Martin was article VI, section 12 of the West Virginia Constitution, which provided:
No person shall be a [S]enator or delegate who has not for one year next preceding his election, been a resident within the district or county from which he is elected; and if a [S]enator or delegate remove from the district or county for which he was elected, his seat shall be thereby vacated.

Martin, 414 S.E.2d at 446 (quoting W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 12).
85. Petitioners-Candidates were residents of Ohio County, West Virginia and Wood County, West Virginia, and sitting delegates in the Third District and Eighth District of the West Virginia Legislature, respectively. Id. at 446. Petitioners sought to “move into different and ‘new’ delegate districts within their current counties” in order “to remain with the bulk of their current constituents.” Id. at 446 n.2.
86. Article VI, section 10 of the West Virginia Constitution provides:
to the general election.\textsuperscript{87} The \textit{Martin} court, after considering the rationale behind residency requirements,\textsuperscript{88} concluded that “none of the evils our [c]onstitution seeks to avoid by [the implementation of a] residency requirement . . . are even vaguely suggested by the facts of either petitioners’ cases.”\textsuperscript{89}

The \textit{Martin} court further reasoned that because “the drafters [of the West Virginia Constitution of 1872] never envisaged this situation where a technical impediment would prevent serving [L]egislators from continuing to represent their own constituents or prevent challengers in like circumstances from filing[,]” to hold otherwise would be to “exalt[,] . . . form over substance” and “invite frequent visits by that most common of political friends, the gerrymander.”\textsuperscript{90} Likewise, because the re-

The arrangement of the senatorial and delegate districts, and apportionment of delegates, shall hereafter be declared by law, as soon as possible after each succeeding census, taken by authority of the United States. When so declared they shall apply to the first general election for members of the Legislature, to be thereafter held, and shall continue in force unchanged, until such districts shall be altered, and delegates apportioned, under the succeeding census.

W. VA. CONST. of 1872, art. VI, § 10; \textit{Martin}, 414 S.E.2d at 446. Pursuant to this provision of the West Virginia Constitution, the Legislature in 1992 “re[-]apportioned the delegate districts,” resulting in Petitioners’ districts being “substantially rearranged.” \textit{Martin}, 414 S.E.2d at 446.

87. The West Virginia Legislature adopted “the re[-]districting statute, Enrolled Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 301 and Enrolled House Bill No. 4043 . . . , less than one year before the 1992 general election.” \textit{Martin}, 414 S.E.2d at 447.

88. \textit{Id.} The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia had previously considered the merits of residency requirements in \textit{White v. Manchin}, 318 S.E.2d 470 (W. Va. 1984). The \textit{White} court found that such requirements “promote candidate familiarity with the needs and problems of the people to be represented . . . promote voter familiarity with the character, intelligence and reputation of the candidates . . . [and] further the goal of precluding frivolous of fraudulent candidacy by those who are more interested in public office than public service.” \textit{Id.} at 446 (quoting \textit{White}, 318 S.E.2d at 489).

89. \textit{Id.} at 446–47. As applied to the rationale behind the residency requirement, the \textit{Martin} court found that Petitioners’ “constituents [were] already familiar with [their] character, intelligence and reputation” and Petitioners “did[not] wish to engage in frivolous or fraudulent candidacies,” but rather “wish[ed] to continue in their current laudable enterprise of public service.” \textit{Id.} at 447.

90. \textit{Id.} at 447. The \textit{Merriam-Webster Dictionary} defines “gerrymandering” as

1. to divide (a territorial unit) into election districts to give one political party an electoral majority in a large number of districts while concentrating the voting strength of the opposition in as few districts as possible;

2. to divide (an area) into political units to give special advantages to one group.

\textit{Gerrymandering}, \textit{MERRIAM-WEBSTER}, \url{http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/gerrymandering} (last visited Aug. 17, 2014). The \textit{Martin} court was clearly concerned that, if allowed to stand, the re-districting provision combined with the residency provision would
apportionment occurred so close in time to the general election, it was not feasible for “[L]egislators or challengers in like circumstances to rearrange their residences within the one year spoken of by [the West Virginia Constitution] article VI, section 12.”

Again, to uphold such a restriction would invite “outrageous and destructive political maneuvering every ten years[,]” contradictory to “the intent of the drafters of [the West Virginia] Constitution.” Thus, the remedy the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia conjured was to uphold the satisfaction of the residency requirement “[i]n those cases in which a person moves to a new district, a part of which was in his old district, after a legislative re-apportionment occurring so close to election day that less than a year remains before the general election.” However, to be eligible for placement on the ballot, the court concluded that the candidate “must actually reside in the district he seeks to serve on or before the day of the general election.”

Contrasting Wenke and Martin are two federal district court cases from District of New Hampshire, Chimento v. Stark and Sununu v. Stark, that were both affirmed directly in memorandum opinions by the United States Supreme Court, as well as a federal district court case from the Western District of Oklahoma: Draper v. Phelps. In Chimento, a three-judge district court panel found that a seven-year-in-state residency requirement for the office of Governor did not violate, inter

allow the hands of the re-districting process to concentrate[e] the voting strength of the opposition in as few districts as possible. Martin, 414 S.E.2d at 447.

91. Martin, 414 S.E.2d at 447.
92. Id.
93. Id. The Martin court therefore granted Petitioners’ writ and directed Respondents—the West Virginia Secretary of State and county election officials—“to accept the petitioners’ ‘Candidate Certificates of Announcement for the 1992 Election,’” Id. Furthermore, the West Virginia Secretary of State was mandated to “revise his official documentation regarding elections accordingly.” Id. The court also directed that “others in similar situations”—such as other potential candidates and election officials—should be guided by this opinion. Id. This can easily be applied to other courts dealing with the merits of similar factual situations.

94. Id.
98. The seven-year-in-state requirement is found in the New Hampshire Constitution, part II, article XLII, which provides: “Qualifications for Governor . . . And no person shall be eligible to this office, unless at the time of his election, he shall have been an inhabitant of this state for [seven] years next preceding, and unless he shall be of the age of [thirty] years.” N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. XLII. Notably, there is no in-district requirement as the office of Governor is a statewide position. Members of the New Hampshire Legislature—Senators and Councillors—must comply with the seven-year-in-state requirement as well as an in-district requirement, which provides only that Legislators “at the time thereof . . .
alia, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Up to the time of the litigation, no other case had yet considered the merits of a durational residency requirement that appeared in a state constitution.

Weighing the facts of the case, the judges applied the “compelling state interest” test and concluded that “the seven[-]year residency requirement acts only as a minimal infringement upon the ability of the plaintiff to participate in the election process and that its limiting effect upon the voters’ choice of candidates is more hypothetical than real.”

The “compelling state interests”—“to ensure that the chief executive officer . . . is exposed to the State and its people,” “giving the voters . . . an opportunity to gain by observation and personal contact some firsthand knowledge of the candidates for Governor[,]” and “to prevent frivolous candidacy by persons who have had little previous exposure to the problems and desires of the people of New Hampshire”—far outweighed what the court viewed as a minimal restriction tailored to those specific state interests. “It [did] not seriously impair the participation of the plaintiff in the election process and [had] only a negligible impact on the voters’ right to have a meaningful choice of candidates for Governor.”

Importantly, the Chimento court noted its place among the branches of government, stating clearly that if this particular residency requirement shall be an inhabitant of the district for which he shall be chosen.” N.H. Const. pt. II, art. XXIX. However, there is no timeframe required in order to comply with this provision. The Chimento court noted that the provision had been included in the New Hampshire Constitution since 1784—a model of other state constitutions, including Massachusetts. Chimento, 353 F. Supp. at 1217–18.


100. Id. at 1215.

101. The Chimento court relied upon Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969); and Ciprano v. City of Homa, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) for the proposition that “if the state’s exercise of this right [to impose candidate restrictions] invades an individual’s constitutional rights, the restrictions become unconstitutional unless there is a showing of a compelling state interest justifying them.” Chimento, 353 F. Supp. at 1215.


103. Id. The Chimento court found that this, of all restrictions, was the “least” as far as limiting candidate availability. Id. at 1216. Furthermore, the requirement “[did] not act as an outright ban on anyone’s candidacy . . . rather, it delays the eligibility of the candidate . . . until a time when he has been a resident of the State for seven years.” Id. Instead, the requirement “insures that the chief executive officer of New Hampshire is exposed to the problems, needs, and desires of the people whom he is to govern,” and also gives the voters “a chance to observe him and gain firsthand knowledge about his habits and character.” Id. at 1217.

104. Id.
was to be eliminated, “it should be accomplished by the voters through the constitutional amending process.”

Sununu then took up the seven-year-in-state residency requirement as it related to State Senators, and found that it similarly was not offensive to equal protection. The Sununu court then repeated the “compelling state interest” test and rationale for holding as much, utilizing the language of Chimento, and upheld the requirement in the same manner. Thus, the Sununu court was “unable to state that the seven-year durational residency requirement [was] not constitutionally ‘tailored’ to the state’s legitimate objectives.”

105. Id. (emphasis added).
106. The specific provision as it relates to Senators is found in article XXIX, clause 1 of the New Hampshire Constitution: “Qualifications of Senators. Provided nevertheless, that no person shall be capable of being elected a [S]enator . . . who shall not have been an inhabitant of this state for seven years immediately preceding his election . . . .” N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. XXIX, cl. 1; Sununu, 383 F. Supp. at 1289. The Sununu court engaged in some historical recounting to assert that “[i]t would be presumptuous for this court to engage in judicial hypothesizing in order to hold unconstitutional a provision of the New Hampshire Constitution which has been unchallenged since 1784 . . . .” Sununu, 383 F. Supp. At 1291. The residency requirement survived multiple challenges to its length: a change from seven to four years via constitutional amendment submitted to the voters failed in 1966 and, although not available at the time, later in 1978. Id.; see also N.H. CONST. pt. II, art. XXIX.
108. Id. at 1290. It is interesting to note that the “compelling state interest” test asserted in Chimento was taken up as applied to State Senators in Sununu, since Chimento stated quite clearly that “[t]he rationale asserted by the State for such a residency requirement carried far greater weight [for the office of Governor] than if it applied to candidacies for lesser public offices”—Senator being one of them. See Chimento, 353 F. Supp. at 1216. In fact, Chimento went so far in finding its rationale for Governors to be different than cases for candidates for lower public offices that it found previous precedent to be “inapposite” to the facts in that matter. Id. at 1216 n.10. The court cited the following cases as example precedent: Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970), aff’d without opinion, 401 U.S. 968 (1971) (Office of State Circuit Judge); Bolanowski v. Raich, 330 F. Supp. 724 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (Mayor); Green v. McKeon, 335 F. Supp. 630 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (all elective/appointive city offices); Mogk v. City of Detroit, 335 F. Supp. 698 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (City Charter Revision Commission); McKinney v. Kaminsky, 340 F. Supp. 289 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (County Commissioner); Wellford v. Battaglia, 343 F. Supp. 143 (D. Del. 1972) (Mayor); Zeilenga v. Nelson, 484 P.2d 578 (Cal. 1971) (Office of County Supervisor); Stapleton v. Clerk for City of Inkster, 311 F. Supp. 1187 (E.D. Mich. 1970) (involving property ownership requirement for the office of City Clerk). Chimento, 353 F. Supp. at 1216 n.10. Seemingly, the Sununu court wrote this argument off by stating that “[a]lthough durational residency requirements for local offices have been held unconstitutional, no court has held unconstitutional a residency requirement for statewide elective office.” 383 F. Supp. at 1290 n.3.
reiterated the rationale from *Chimento* that any such change should come from the voters via a constitutional amendment.\textsuperscript{110}

Additionally, in *Draper v. Phelps*,\textsuperscript{111} a federal district court upheld a six-month-in-district residency requirement\textsuperscript{112} for candidates for the Oklahoma House of Representatives against equal protection challenges.\textsuperscript{113} This court, like *Chimento* and *Sununu*, pursued its analysis under the “compelling [state] interest standard”\textsuperscript{114} and likewise concluded that the durational residency requirement was “reasonably necessary to the accomplishment of legitimate state objectives,” which included, again, “preventing frivolous and fraudulent candidacy by persons who have had no previous exposure to the problems and desires of the electorate of a representative district[,]” giving the problems of a district considerable weight and consideration, making plans for candidacy in advance of election, and preventing harm to the voter.\textsuperscript{115}

**C. Relevant United States Supreme Court Precedent**

While the Supreme Court has yet to grant certiorari in a case stemming from the intersection of durational residency requirements and a state’s re-apportionment process, there are several cases dealing with election requirements that have guided lower courts in deciding these issues for multiple decades. These cases foreshadow how the Supreme Court may rule in the future, but still, they merely deal with the relevant

\textsuperscript{110} *Id.*

\textsuperscript{111} 351 F. Supp. 677 (W.D. Ok. 1972).

\textsuperscript{112} The Oklahoma Constitution provides, in article III, section 1, that “[q]ualified electors of this state shall . . . citizens of the state . . . who have resided in the state at least six months, in the county two months, and in the election precinct twenty days next preceding the election at which such elector offers to vote.” OK. CONST. art. III, § 1; *Draper*, 351 F. Supp. at 679. To be qualified as a candidate for the House of Representatives of the Legislature of Oklahoma, “the candidate must have been a qualified registered elector in such district for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the filing period prescribed by law . . . .” *Draper*, 351 F. Supp. at 679 (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 14, § 108 (1971)).

\textsuperscript{113} *Draper*, 351 F. Supp. at 686. Importantly, however, the residency requirement was not challenged involving a situation where the candidate’s municipality was re-districted out of his voting district. Rather, Plaintiffs in this matter simply stipulated that they did not comply with the residency requirements and sued in the hopes of relief from the courts. *Id.* at 680. However, the *Draper* court still mentioned the re-apportionment process in detail in order to prop up the rationale that “[t]he exposure of candidates to voters . . . must necessarily be personal and personalized” because, particularly in Oklahoma, the re-apportionment process must look to the different districts together in order to maintain proper representation. *See id.* at 684–85.

\textsuperscript{114} This standard was asserted by the United States Supreme Court in *Bullock v. Carter*, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972).

\textsuperscript{115} *Draper*, 351 F. Supp. at 682–83.
scrutiny standard for equal protection challenges. Dunn v. Blumenstein found that a durational residency requirement could be subject to strict scrutiny when it directly impacted the right to vote and to travel. The Court asserted that lower courts are to look to three things when reviewing equal protection claims of these matters: “[1] the classification in question; [2] the individual interests affected by the classification; and [3] the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification.” Likewise was Bullock v. Carter, which involved a required filing fee as a means for running for public office. The Court found that heightened scrutiny could apply when such a requirement “has a real and appreciable impact on the exercise of the franchise [of candidacy], and because this impact is related to the resources of the voters supporting a particular candidate . . . the laws must be ‘closely scrutinized . . . .’”

IV. MODERN CHALLENGES CONCERNING RESIDENCY REQUIREMENTS IN NEW JERSEY

A. The 2001 Legislative Re-apportionment Process

In 2001, the decennial re-apportionment process wreaked havoc in the court system as partisan gamesmanship fueled claims that the legislative re-districting map violated the First, Fourteenth, and

117. Id. at 335.
119. Id. at 144.
120. The map that was voted on essentially created a New Jersey Legislature that swept control out of Republican hands, and into that of Democrats. Lawmakers blamed this, in part, on the map that sided with the Democrats. For example, State Senator Kevin O’Toole, a Republican, was quoted as saying “[t]he map gave the Democrats an illegitimate majority” and “blew out the concept of the two-party system in New Jersey.” Josh Margolin, State’s Controversial Voting District Maps May Be Challenged, NJ.COM (Mar. 15, 2009, 7:30 AM), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/03/states_controversial_voting_di.html. News reports foresaw this conclusion as soon as the 2001 map came out. For example, the New York Times reported that “David Rebovich, a professor of political science at Rider University in Lawrenceville, N.J., said the new map makes the Democrats competitive in several districts.” See Robert Hanley, New Districts Imperil G.O.P. in New Jersey, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2001, at B5. Prior to his governorship, State Senator Richard Codey—then a member of the 2001 re-apportionment committee—likewise stated that “[t]he new Assembly clearly will be Democratic” and expected Democrats to capture the Senate. Id. Over the course of the next decade, this would come to pass. See Margolin, supra ("The New Jersey GOP . . . has been the minority party after the district lines were re-drawn nearly a decade ago . . . .").
Fifteenth Amendments. A federal district court took up a parallel challenge to the map in the matter of how the newly-apportioned districts affected sitting Legislators and candidates for the State Legislature vis-à-vis the state constitutional residency requirement for such offices in Robertson v. Bartels ("Robertson I").

Robertson I concerned two plaintiffs—Dennis E. Gonzalez and Jay R. Schwartz—and defendant John Farmer, then the New Jersey Attorney General. Both plaintiffs were candidates for the New Jersey General Assembly who were considered ineligible to run for office in 2001 due to the one-year-in-district residency requirement in article IV, section 1, clause 2 of the New Jersey Constitution.

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122. 150 F. Supp. 2d 691 (2001) [hereinafter Robertson I]. The three count of the plaintiffs' complaint in the first Robertson case, 148 F. Supp. 2d 443 (2001), addressing the residency requirement, was referred solely to Judge Debevoise for disposition and thus was never a part of the Robertson litigation adjudicated at the United States Supreme Court level. The Robertson three-judge panel found that the standard they were to follow for addressing the residency challenge together with the challenge to the re-districting map was for the residency challenge to be "inextricably intertwined" with the constitutional challenges. Robertson, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 461 (emphasis omitted) (citing Page v. Bartels, 248 F.3d 175, 190 (3d Cir. 2001)). Based on the facts, delineated infra in this Note, the court concluded: "[I]t is plain that the re-districting and residency issues are so distinct that the sound exercise of discretion should lead us to refer the voting rights issue to a single judge for disposition," and therefore referred the claim to a single judge, decided in Robertson I. Robertson, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 461–62; see also infra. As Judge Debevoise was an original member of the three-judge panel, he did not require oral argument for the disposition in the latter case. See Robertson I, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 693.

123. Then-Assemblyman Gerald H. Zucker had, at one point, joined the litigation as a plaintiff. Robertson I, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 693 n.2. However, as he remained "eligible to run because he continue[d] to reside in the newly configured Thirty-fourth District," Judge Debevoise concluded that he did not "face the barrier caused by the residency requirement" and was therefore not party to the action. Id. at 693. Moreover, the lead plaintiff—Senator Norman Robertson—then the sitting Senator from the Thirty-fourth District, did not assert that the residency requirement applied to him as his municipality had not been moved out of the district in the 2001 re-apportionment map. Robertson, 148 F. Supp. 2d at 460 n.14.

124. Robertson I, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 693.

125. Id. at 693–94; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 2. The relevant provision provides that:

[n]o person shall be a member of the Senate who shall not have attained the age of thirty years, and have been a citizen and resident of the state for four years, and of the district for which he shall be elected one year, next before his election. No person shall be a member of the General Assembly who shall not have attained the age of twenty-one years and have been a citizen and resident of the State for two years, and of the district for which he shall be elected one year next before his
moved their residences from one municipality to another in 2001, and, regardless of the fact that the re-apportionment process changed the district map layout for these municipalities, could not meet the requirement’s demands, causing them to challenge the requirement’s constitutionality on equal protection grounds. Relying upon United States Supreme Court precedent, the Robertson I court determined that the residency requirement was subject to the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause based on “the character of the classification in question; the individual interests affected by the classification; and the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification.” The court conceded that courts across the country had rejected and upheld residency requirements on an equal protection basis, asserting that “the weighing process in each case is fact

election. No person shall be eligible for membership in the Legislature unless he be entitled to the right of suffrage.

N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 2.

126. Gonzalez moved in January 2001 from Paterson, New Jersey, to Clifton, New Jersey—under both the previous and 2001 re-apportionment maps, Paterson and Clifton were in the Thirty-fourth and Thirty-fifth Districts, respectively. See Robertson I, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 693–94. Thus, Gonzalez’s barrier to candidacy remained intact. Id. at 694.

Schwartz moved in March 2001 from West Paterson, New Jersey to Little Falls, New Jersey. Id. Under the previous re-apportionment map, West Paterson was in the Thirty-fifth District and Little Falls was in the Thirty-fourth District. Id. Then, under the 2001 map, West Paterson was in the Thirty-fourth District and Little Falls was in the Fortieth District. Id. Thus, his barrier similarly remained intact. Id. The court found that the case “implicate[d] primarily equal protection considerations,” “[a]lthough plaintiffs advance[d] free speech and right to travel contentions” in their complaint. Id.

127. The Robertson I court relied primarily upon Dunn and Bullock for the proper rationale behind determining the constitutionality of “restrictions on the right of persons to run for office.” Id.

128. Id. (citing Dunn v. Blumenstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972)).


sensitive.” The court noted that “a fundamental right [was] at stake,” but not that of the right to travel or the right to free speech, but rather “the combined right of persons to run for public office and the right of voters to vote for candidates of their choice.”

The Robertson I court noted that the state Attorney General’s office asserted rationales for the residency requirement equivalent to those of Matthews and Stothers. However, it quickly did away with that argument, finding that “in a number of cases these [rationales] have not been found to represent compelling state interests when weighed against residency requirements imposed upon voters or potential candidates.” The court rejected the idea that residency requirements were needed by the state to allow voters to familiarize themselves with the candidates, preventing fraudulent candidacies, and “for the voters to recognize the new resident of the district,” writing that these rationales required “a considerable stretch of the imagination,” and utilizing Dunn as significant precedent. Additionally, the Robertson I court found that the “lack of substance to the State’s interest in the one year residency requirement” stemmed from the fact that both candidates were separated from districts that knew them well, or because of the re-districting process, not at all. The Robertson I court thus held that the one-year

131. Id. at 695–96. The Attorney General had argued, seemingly successfully, that this matter did not affect the rights to free speech and travel. Id.

132. Id. These rationales included:
   i) “[T]he-one year requirement allows the people of New Jersey the necessary opportunity to become familiar with a potential candidate” . . . ii) “preventing political carpet bagging” and iii) “. . . for the benefit of all the [s]tate’s residents, [the residency requirement] allows a candidate the opportunity to become familiar with the issues and concerns that are important to the people he or she seeks to represent.”

133. Id. at 696.

134. Id. The Robertson I court found that the ability of voters to familiarize themselves with a political candidate was rejected by the Second Circuit in Billington v. Hayduk—that mandating a residency requirement “appear[ed] unrelated” to whether the voters “could satisfy themselves of [a] candidate’s sincerity and knowledgeable.” Billington v. Hayduk, 439 F. Supp. 975, 979 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff’d, 565 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1977). Likewise, Dunn, “rejected both the prevention of fraud and ensuring knowledgeable voters as sufficiently compelling to justify a voter residency requirement.” Robertson I, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 696 (citing Dunn v. Blumenstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972)).

135. Id. at 696–97.

136. Id. Adding to the Robertson I court’s rationale was the fact that re-districting in New Jersey’s two largest municipalities—Newark and Jersey City—creates political boundaries that literally “run down the middle of streets and through the heart of local neighborhoods.” Id. at 698.
residency requirement “d[id] not survive a strict scrutiny analysis” and “[w]as, therefore, violative of the Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause.”

The decision in Robertson I enjoined the ability for state election officers to enforce the article IV provision against those who may not have met its requirement, and was left untouched for over a decade. This would not have a tangible effect until the next time that the legislative districts were re-apportioned in 2011. In the meantime, however, the provision succeeded in keeping Olympic superstar Carl Lewis off the ballot.

B. Carl Lewis and the Solidified Difference Between In-District and In-State

On April 11, 2011, Olympic gold-medalist Carl Lewis announced his candidacy for State Senator of New Jersey’s Eighth District. However, only a few days later, Lieutenant Governor Kim Guadagno—New Jersey’s chief election official—removed him from consideration on the ballot, concluding that there was “credible evidence” that he had not lived.

137. Id. at 698–99. The Robertson I court distinguished the facts of the matter from those of Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211, 1213 (D.N.H. 1973) (three-judge panel), aff’d, 414 U.S. 802 (1973); and Sununu v. Stark, 383 F. Supp. 1287, 1291 (D.N.H. 1974) (three-judge panel), aff’d, 420 U.S. 958 (1975) by utilizing the language from Chimento finding that the rationale for upholding residency requirements for a state’s highest office “carries far greater weight than if applied to candidacies for lesser public offices”—the New Jersey General Assembly being one of lower status than a Governor or a Senator—those “elected from political subdivisions of much smaller geographical dimensions, the precise boundaries of which are subject to periodic revision.” Robertson I, 150 F. Supp. 2d at 698–99. The Robertson I court finally asserted that, despite the provision being in the New Jersey Constitution akin to the provision in the New Hampshire Constitution referenced in Chimento and Sununu, the New Jersey Constitution “is of much more recent vintage” and lacks the “venerable heritage of New Hampshire’s charter.” Id. at 699. This language was cleared up in Robertson II, which stated that while the New Jersey Constitution dates back to 1776, the relevant provision providing for political re-districting only dates back to 1966, “when the New Jersey Constitution was amended in order to comply with the Supreme Court’s one-person, one-vote requirement set forth in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).” Robertson v. Bartels, 890 F. Supp. 2d 519, 532–33 (D.N.J. 2012).

138. See Statehouse Bureau Staff, Olympic Gold Medalist Carl Lewis Announces Plan to Run for N.J. Senate, STAR-LEDGER (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/04/olympic_gold_medalist_carl_lew.html. Predicting a strategy that would soon play out in the courts, Lewis’s opponent, sitting Senator Dawn Marie Addiego’s spokesman was quoted at the time as saying, among other things, that “we still don’t know much else other than that he just registered to vote in New Jersey today.” Id. Lewis was the highest profile candidate for State Senate at the time, and the preferred candidate of the New Jersey Democratic Party. See also New Jersey Democratic State Committee, Wisniewski on Carl Lewis: A Leader Who Transcends Politics, POLITICKERNJ (Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.politickernj.com/46720/wisniewski-carl-lewis-leader-who-transcends-politics.
in New Jersey for the four years required by the state constitution, including the critical fact that he recently lived in California.\textsuperscript{139} Lewis then petitioned both state and federal court for relief from Guadagno’s decision.\textsuperscript{140}

In Lewis v. Guadagno ("Lewis I"),\textsuperscript{141} the district court relied heavily upon Sununu and denied Lewis’s motion seeking an injunction against the removal of his name from the ballot.\textsuperscript{142} The Lewis I court found specifically that Lewis “failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits, in that Sununu v. Stark . . . [were] binding and controlling
The court went further in stating that even if Sununu was not binding, Lewis still would not prevail on the merits because—even under a strict scrutiny standard—the state still asserted proper rationale for why durational in-state residency requirements “furthered a compelling interest,” particularly for Senators: the desire for familiarity with district needs, senatorial powers above and beyond those of lower-house Legislators, and the fact that “the entire State is affected by [a Senator’s] decisions.”

However, most importantly, the Lewis I decision parsed around the “intrastate/interstate dichotomy” that properly distinguishes the facts in Lewis from other cases. The court ruled that precluding Lewis from the ballot due to a failure to satisfy the interstate eligibility requirement comported with existing case law, but conceded, inter alia, that “the federal constitutional concerns and the opportunity for an improper motive to bar an otherwise legitimate candidate[] may be more pronounced where the case involves a narrowly defined geographical area and a less significant political subdivision,” also known as intrastate eligibility. The Lewis I court then put forth as an example of when a “compelling justification or discernable reason” would necessitate a court to strike down a residency requirement: the Robertson I decision. Thus, arguably, the Robertson I decision’s rationale was upheld and utilized by the Lewis I court to a large extent in order to distinguish its facts on Lewis’s facial challenge. However, on an initial appeal in Lewis II, the Third Circuit ordered a preliminary injunction mandating that Lewis’s
name appear on the ballot, but remanded to the district court for an analysis on Lewis’s challenge to the residency requirement on “as-applied” equal protection grounds.\textsuperscript{150}

On remand, the district court in \textit{Lewis III}\textsuperscript{151} applied a “rational basis” standard of review to Lewis’s as-applied challenge, and found that the in-state residency requirement was, once again, reasonably related to legitimate state interests.\textsuperscript{152} The \textit{Lewis III} court significantly relied upon \textit{Bullock} for the proposition that “[a] restriction placed upon political candidates does not warrant heightened scrutiny unless the restriction substantially interferes with or disrupts the right to vote, severely distorts the political playing field, or otherwise offends another constitutional right.”\textsuperscript{153}

Thereafter, the court found that since the requirement “governs all individuals fairly and equally, without regard to or reliance on any suspect classification,” and only had an “appreciable impact” on candidates who had not resided in the state for more than four years, the requirement must simply pass rational basis muster, which it easily did.\textsuperscript{154} On Lewis’s as-applied challenge, the court simply found that the requirement did not “discriminate against . . . or deprive [Lewis] of fundamental rights,” but, instead, “[t]he only impediment [Lewis] suffer[ed] as a result of the residency requirement is enjoinment from pursuing the New Jersey office of State Senator, and only then until he has been a citizen and resident in New Jersey for four years.”\textsuperscript{155}

On the final appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s opinion in \textit{Lewis IV}.\textsuperscript{156} The Third Circuit found that, while Lewis


\textsuperscript{151} Lewis v. Guadagno, 837 F. Supp. 2d 404, 410–11 (D.N.J. 2011) (‘\textit{Lewis III}’).

\textsuperscript{152} Id. at 413, 416.

\textsuperscript{153} Id. at 411 (emphasis added); \textit{see infra} Section IV-A.

\textsuperscript{154} Lewis \textit{III}, 837 F. Supp. 2d at 412–14.

\textsuperscript{155} Id. at 416.

\textsuperscript{156} Lewis v. Guadagno, 445 F. App’x 599, 604 (3d Cir. 2011) [hereinafter \textit{Lewis IV}]. Interestingly, the Third Circuit panel, consisting of Judges Anthony Joseph Scirica, Thomas L. Ambro, and Thomas Ignatius Vanaskie, initially ordered that the district court opinion be reversed in a 2-1 decision (Judge Scirica dissented for reasons never explained by the court), because it “incorrectly applied a rational basis standard of review of this as-applied challenge, rather than the stricter compelling interest standard.” \textit{See} Order, Lewis v. Guadagno, 445 F. App’x 599 (3d Cir. Sept. 13, 2011). The Third Circuit thus initially placed Lewis back on the ballot, stating that “[t]he state . . . failed to demonstrate a compelling
“appear[ed] to [have] argue[d] that he has a fundamental right to run for office,” such an argument was rejected by the United States Supreme Court, and as the Lewis IV court did not want to re-litigate the state-law issues found by other courts or address a facial challenge, it instead concluded that Lewis “failed to show that, as applied to him, the four-year state residency requirement . . . treated him unfairly.” The Lewis matter showed that the case law regarding interstate residency requirements is, for the most part, closed; especially when dealing with offices of power that implicate a statewide presence, like Governor or Senator, because courts are much more likely to uphold them under equal protection, and do so under intermediate scrutiny. However, as Lewis I pointed out, when dealing with intrastate residency requirements, the law is still ripe to be challenged should the right litigant come along. Many believed that litigant might very well been New Jersey General Assembly candidate and election winner Gabriela Mosquera.

state interest in the application of this durational residency requirement to this particular candidate.” Id. This Order was covered far and wide in the news media. See, e.g., Matt Friedman, Federal Appeals Court Panel Puts Carl Lewis Back on Ballot for State Senate Race, STAR-LEDGER (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/09/federal_judge_puts_carl_lewis.html; Carl Lewis is Back on NJ Senate Ballot, NEW YORK POST (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/carl_lewis_aims_again_at_spot_on_T9fw3E TmDBEDDgLyYMILT. However, on September 20, 2011, it was reported that the three-judge panel, which had not issued their formal opinion yet, was reconsidering their Order. See Judges Reconsidering Carl Lewis Election Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 20, 2011) [hereinafter Reconsidering Carl Lewis], http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/olympics/story/2011-09-20/carl-lewis-election/50479726/1. The appellees had made clear that they would seek for the Third Circuit to hear the case en banc or appeal to the United States Supreme Court; but for the panel itself to reconsider is “rare.” Id. In a second Order dated September 19, 2011, the panel ordered a rehearing, and thus vacated its previous Order, to address the questions: “(1) Can a person be a citizen of two states?; (2) What are the requirements of California law for a person to vote in that State?; [and] (3) To what extent can a federal court interpret a state constitution?” Order, Lewis v. Guadagno, 445 F. App’x 599 (3d Cir. Sept. 19, 2011). Foreshadowing the Third Circuit’s ultimate opinion, Judge Ambro stated at oral argument for the second Order that “[t]he more you look at it . . . the more concern I have.” See Reconsidering Carl Lewis, supra.

157. Lewis IV, 445 F. App’x at 603–04. The Lewis IV court made a point to state that the facial challenge posed by Lewis was controlled by Sununu, and that the district court was correct in that respect in Lewis I. See id. at n.5. After the Third Circuit ruled against him, Lewis abandoned his run for the State Senate seat in New Jersey, precluding a Third Circuit ruling en banc or an appeal to the United States Supreme Court. See Matt Friedman, Carl Lewis Gives Up Fight to Run for N.J. State Senate, STAR-LEDGER (Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/09/carl_lewis_gives_up_fight_to_r.html.

C. Gabriela Mosquera and the Creation of a Perfect Intrastate Claim

1. Ms. Mosquera’s Claims Were Imperfect

On November 8, 2011, the voters in New Jersey’s Fourth District cast their ballots to elect their State Senator and two Assembly members. Incumbent Senator Fred Madden was re-elected, as was incumbent Assemblyman Paul D. Moriarty. In addition, candidate Gabriela Mosquera was certified as the second Assembly winner, with a tally of 19,845 votes to her next closest challenger, Shelly Lovett’s 14,316 votes. Yet, barely a month after her election, Mosquera’s decisive win was challenged by Lovett in state court on grounds that Mosquera had not met the one-year residency requirement enjoined a decade prior by Robertson I.

In the initial case, In re Contest of Nov. 8, 2011 General Election of Office of New Jersey General Assembly, Fourth Legislative District (“In re Contest I”), Mosquera stipulated that she did not meet the one-year-in-district residency requirement prior to her election, but argued that the Robertson I injunction prevented the provision from being enforced, and that the provision otherwise was violative of equal protection. Crucially, however, Mosquera admitted that she had not failed to satisfy the in-district residency requirement due in any part to the 2011 re-

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162. See Jessica Bautista, Assemblywoman-Elect Challenged on Her Residency, SOUTH JERSEY TIMES (Dec. 14, 2011), http://www.nj.com/gloucester-county/index.ssf/2011/12/assemblywoman-elect_challenged.html. Previewing the attorneys’ arguments about the facts of Mosquera’s case and the re-districting process that occurred in the same year, the attorney for Lovett posited at oral argument that “[Mosquera] was from the seventh district. She wasn’t on the border of the fourth district and she wasn’t in the district either way.” Id. To reiterate, New Jersey’s residency requirement for candidates for the General Assembly is found in article IV, section 1, paragraph 2 of the modern New Jersey Constitution.


164. Id. at 1169.
districting process; in other words, her resident municipality was not transferred out of the Fourth District.\textsuperscript{165}

Mosquera and Lovett, as well as the New Jersey Attorney General, agreed that the \textit{Robertson I} opinion was not binding on the New Jersey state court system since it was a federal district court opinion.\textsuperscript{166} This created the need for the Superior Court of New Jersey to decide the merits of whether the provision violated equal protection in spite of a district court ruling.\textsuperscript{167} Contrary to \textit{Robertson I}, the \textit{In re Contest I} court determined that the residency requirement in this matter was subject to intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny, and utilized the \textit{Matthews} standard because it found that the requirement was not based on a suspect criterion, and that there exists no fundamental right to candidacy.\textsuperscript{168}

Thus, the majority opinion made it clear that, if a challenger could show that her candidacy was rendered invalid by virtue of her failure to meet the residency requirement because her resident municipality was moved out of her resident district, an as-applied challenge would be perfected, and judicial surgery of the provision may be required, “were the [c]ourt to first find that the . . . requirement operated unconstitutionally in that context . . . .”\textsuperscript{169} The \textit{In re Contest I} court then criticized the \textit{Robertson I} opinion for “read[ing] Dunn and Bullock too broadly,” not acknowledging that strict scrutiny only applies to restrictions that interfere with fundamental rights, being unrepresentative of a “uniform position on the part of the federal lower courts,” and failing to persuade the \textit{Lewis} courts.\textsuperscript{170}

Ultimately, however, the \textit{In re Contest I} court upheld the residency requirement under intermediate scrutiny.\textsuperscript{171} The court reiterated the “legitimate state interests”\textsuperscript{172} in the requirement’s continued existence (as mentioned in \textit{Matthews}), found that the requirement was “reasonably and suitably tailored” to those interests, and therefore refused to “strike down a constitutional provision that was drawn by the framers of New

\begin{footnotes}
\item[165.] \textit{Id.} at 1168–69. Mosquera’s resident municipality was previously Maple Shade, New Jersey, which was never a part of the Fourth District, but she moved to the Fourth District’s municipality of Blackwood in December 2010. \textit{Id.} at 1169–70.
\item[166.] \textit{Id.} at 1168.
\item[167.] \textit{Id.} at 1178–82.
\item[168.] \textit{Id.} at 1182–84.
\item[169.] \textit{In re Contest I}, 48 A.3d at 1184–85, 1191.
\item[170.] \textit{Id.} at 1185.
\item[171.] \textit{Id.} at 1185–89.
\item[172.] The factors are, again: “1) a candidate’s familiarity with public issues and concerns; 2) the electorate’s knowledge of the candidate and his or her electoral positions . . . and 3) the prevention of ‘political carpetbagging.’” \textit{Id.} at 1189–90 (citation omitted).
\end{footnotes}
Jersey’s original constitution.” The court offered further rationale for its position: members of the General Assembly are “key officers in the state government[,]” and it is therefore reasonable for them to adhere to a time period of residency that “imposes minimal burdens,” and in addition, the constitutionality of “requiring] that a state elected official reside for a substantial period before election in the district in which he is running for office” has been upheld by the United States Supreme Court.

Lastly, In re Contest I took Robertson I to task on a number of issues in order to justify a ruling that did not comport with Robertson I’s reasoning. The court found that Robertson I’s holding was an anomaly among federal courts with respect to residency requirements. Next, unlike Robertson I, the In re Contest I court found the “legitimate [s]tate interests” more compelling and felt as though Robertson I “gave [those interests] short shrift.” The In re Contest I court also believed Robertson I was wrong in stating that the New Jersey Constitution “is of much more recent vintage” and lacks “venerable heritage” in distinguishing its facts from those of Chimento and Sununu since the provision dates back to New Jersey’s first constitution in 1776.

173. Id. at 1189–93 (quoting Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211, 1217 (1973)).
174. Id. at 1191–93 (quoting Stothers v. Martini, 79 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1951)). The In re Contest I court relied on Hadnott v. Amos, 320 F. Supp. 107 (M.D. Ala. 1970), aff’d mem., 401 U.S. 968 (1971), aff’d mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972) for the proposition that it is constitutional for state officials to be required to reside in the districts in which they are running for office for a time period prior to their election. Id. at 1174–75 n.6. Hadnott was a district court case summarily affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in both 1971 and 1972. 401 U.S. at 968; 405 U.S. at 1035. In Hadnott, the United States Supreme Court “affirmed . . . a decision upholding, against a federal a [e]qual p[rotection] challenge, a provision of the Alabama Constitution requiring that a state circuit judge reside ‘for one year next preceding his election’ in ‘the circuit for which he is elected.’” In re Contest I, 48 A.3d 1164 at 1173 (quoting Hadnott, 320 F. Supp. at 119–20). It is worth noting the precedential value of this case—twice summarily affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, rather than decided on the merits—and its difference from In re Contest I, specifically that it dealt with an elected judge rather than a Legislator. Political districts are certainly different in size and alterability via re-districting than circuits for judges. In addition, as the In re Contest I court noted, Hadnott did not “decide whether one year was too long,” but found only that “the state had ‘a compelling interest in imposing a substantial pre-election residence requirement.’” Id. at 1173 n.6. (quoting Hadnott, 320 F. Supp. at 119, 124). This, in the author’s view, represents shaky ground that the In re Contest I court relied upon.
175. In re Contest I, 48 A.3d at 1191–97.
176. Id. at 1196–97.
177. Id. at 1193–94.
178. Id. at 1194 (quoting Robertson v. Bartels, 150 F. Supp. 2d 691, 699 (D.N.J. 2001)).
Critical to the *In re Contest I* court’s analysis of *Robertson I*’s decision was its discussion regarding re-apportionment and its effect on the residency requirement. The court noted that in adopting the re-apportionment amendment to the New Jersey Constitution, voters still believed “it was . . . important for the candidates and the voters to get to know each other even if, and perhaps especially because, the legislative district boundaries would be adjusted every ten years.” The court still found that the Equal Protection Clause was not violated because the government’s objectives “remain legitimate, even if those adjustments may pose practical issues every ten years.” The court also found *Robertson I*’s distinctions regarding the differences between Senators and lower-office-holders to be “untenable” in the face of *Chimento* and *Sununu*.

*In re Contest I* was able to distinguish its facts, as well as those in *Robertson I*, from a proper intra-district challenge because, in both matters, “the re-apportionment did not cause the issue for the [plaintiffs]”—that is, neither had their municipality re-apportioned out of their district so that they could not meet the residency requirement in their original district. Such facts would otherwise represent the perfection of an equal protection challenge to the residency requirement, something that “did not cause the issue” for Ms. Mosquera. Indeed, the *In re Contest I* court noted:

[that does not mean that re-apportionment might not pose an issue in ten years, after the next decennial census. As [Robertson I] hypothesized . . . a candidate could move to a town within his district after early November 2020, only to have the new town re-apportioned into another district before the November 2021 elections. Before 2021, that issue may be addressed in legislation or regulation implementing [the provision].

After the issuance of the trial court opinion, state Democrats were thrown into disarray and immediately sought an appeal. On the initial

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179. *Id.* at 1195.
180. *Id.* (emphasis added).
181. *In re Contest I*, 48 A.3d at 1194 n.21.
182. *Id.* at 1193–94.
183. *Id.* at 1194 n.21 (emphasis added). *In re Contest I* found that the time period for challenging the 2011 elections, per N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:29-3 (West 2011), had expired by the time the court issued its opinion, meaning no further challenges due to re-apportionment would be heard until the next round in 2021. *Id.* at 1194.
184. Senator Fred Madden, the sitting Senator in New Jersey’s Fourth District and the Gloucester County Democratic Party Chairman, stated, “We felt we were right. She had run under an existing law. [The injunction] had been on the books for ten or eleven years . . .
appeal to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, the court granted a stay of the trial decision, which allowed Ms. Mosquera to be sworn into office as the winner of her election. Judge Anthony Parillo, writing for the appellate panel, “concluded that there [was] a likelihood [that] respondent [would] succeed.” Lovett then filed for emergent relief from the Supreme Court of New Jersey to prevent Ms. Mosquera from taking her seat, which was thereafter supported by the New Jersey Attorney General. In dramatic fashion, only minutes before she was to be sworn in, the New Jersey Supreme Court stayed the panel’s decision in an interim order and took up the case on appeal, preventing Ms. Mosquera from taking her seat.

. . . She won (the election) by an overwhelming margin. She was a great candidate for office, and we will stand behind her.” See Carly Q. Romalino, Superior Court Order Voids Mosquera of Fourth District Assembly Seat Victory, SOUTH JERSEY TIMES (Jan. 6, 2012), http://www.nj.com/gloucester-county/index.ssf/2012/01/superior_court_order_voids_mos.html. Ms. Mosquera’s attorney, William Tambussi, was quoted at the time as saying, “It’s an unexpected outcome for sure . . . . The judge, in one swipe of the pen, erased 19,907 votes for Gabby Mosquera” and noted he was filing an “electronic appeal.” Id. The New Jersey Democratic State Party Chairman John Wisniewski also released a statement criticizing the judge’s decision. See Press Release, New Jersey Democratic State Committee, Wisniewski Condemns Decision Disenfranchising Over 19,000 Fourth District Voters, POLITICKERNJ (Jan. 7, 2012), http://www.politickernj.com/53649/wisniewski-condemns-decision-disenfranchising-over-19000-4th-district-voters.

185. See Matt Friedman, Assemblywoman-Elect to be Sworn in Despite Not Living in Legislative District for One Year, STAR LEDGER (Jan. 9, 2012), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2012/01/assemblywoman-elect_to_be_swor.html.


187. See Darryl R. Isherwood, AG Weighs in Against Mosquera Swearing In, POLITICKERNJ (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.politickernj.com/53810/ag-weighs-against-mosquera-swearing. Interestingly, New Jersey Attorney General Jeffrey Chiesa’s first action as Attorney General was to file a brief with the New Jersey Supreme Court in opposition to Ms. Mosquera’s swearing in. Id. Chiesa wrote: “To the extent that the [a]ppellate [d]ivision’s [st]ay Order allows Mosquera to take the oath of office in the General Assembly and said oath deprives the judiciary of available remedies, the [st]ay Order constitutes irreparable harm.” Id.

188. Ms. Mosquera was scheduled to be sworn in on January 10, 2012 at noon, and even had her name displayed on the Assembly Chamber voting board. See Politicker Staff, Breaking: Court Blocks Mosquera Swearing In, POLITICKERNJ (Jan. 10, 2012), http://www.politickernj.com/53811/breaking-court-blocks-mosquera-swearing.

189. See In re Contest of Nov. 8, 2011 Gen. Election of Office of N.J. Gen. Assembly, Fourth Legislative Dist., 37 A.3d 1089 (2012) (stating, inter alia, that “[n]o person shall hereafter take the oath of office as a member of the New Jersey General Assembly for the Fourth Legislative District pending disposition of this appeal or further order of the [c]ourt”). See also Carly Q. Romalino, Mosquera Swearing in on Hold After Court Action,
In In re Contest of November 8, 2011 General Election of Office of New Jersey General Assembly ("In re Contest II"), the Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed the trial court opinion, concluding that the residency requirement is properly analyzed through and constitutional under intermediate scrutiny. On Ms. Mosquera’s facial challenge, the court continued to use Dunn and Bullock standards to preclude an application of strict scrutiny, and ultimately upheld the intermediate standard in Matthews—bucking the Robertson I opinion. The court reiterated that “the one-year durational residency requirement advances [the aforementioned state interests] more than sufficiently to surpass a facial constitutional challenge.”

The In re Contest II court criticized Robertson I further: “Robertson . . . seriously undervalued the legitimacy, history, and sincerity[] of this state’s policy choice to have a one-year durational residency requirement for General Assembly office.” Additionally, the court found, as the trial court did, that Robertson erred in “assum[ing] that the 1947 constitution’s durational requirement lacked the ‘venerable heritage’ of the allegedly longer-standing one of New Hampshire [in Chimento and Sununu]” which, according to the court, “exposes the questionable factual basis on which [Robertson I] rests.”

2. In re Contest II Left the Door Open to Future Challenges

In affirming the trial court’s opinion, In re Contest II agreed with the Superior Court judge that Ms. Mosquera’s as-applied challenge could likewise not survive. However, the court took pains to note that the challenge did not occur based on the re-apportionment process: “[Ms. Mosquera] was not a resident rendered ineligible for candidacy for office in her district as a result of the legislative re-apportionment that took effect less than one year prior to the general election.” The court left the door open should such a perfect challenge occur: “[t]o the extent that a future as-applied challenge might arise in the immediate wake of the


191. Id. at 687–89.
192. Id. at 695–99.
193. Id. at 699–700.
194. Id. at 701–02.
195. Id.
196. In re Contest II, 40 A.3d at 704.
197. Id. at 704–05.
legislative re-apportionment that must occur decennially, see [the New Jersey Constitution, article IV, section 3, paragraph 1], we do not foreclose such an action for relief." \(^{198}\)

In his dissent in *In re Contest II*, Chief Justice Stuart J. Rabner concluded "the requirement raises serious constitutional concerns during re-districting years, when a substantial number of citizens are ‘re[-]districted’ out of their previous home districts." \(^{199}\)

Chief Justice Rabner first noted that, when the final result of the decennial census is completed, and the “[s]tate’s [a]pportionment [c]ommission meets to re[-]draw district boundaries[,] . . . [a] process . . . not completed until early in the year of an election for State Senate and General Assembly,” those living in towns re-districted out will not have satisfied the residency requirement “by the time of the fall election.” \(^{200}\) As pointed out in *Robertson I*, this process:

affected more than one-third of New Jersey’s 566 towns [and] [a]s a result, not a single adult resident in roughly one-third of the state’s localities could run for the [G]eneral [A]ssembly, or vote for a neighbor who wanted to run, under the strict terms of the residency requirement. Yet[,] none of those individuals relocated to a new area, are less familiar with the issues where they continue to live, or are less well-known to their neighbors. \(^{201}\)

Thus, Chief Justice Rabner suggested that, even under intermediate scrutiny via *Matthews*, the scope of the residency requirement during re-districting years might not survive. \(^{202}\) Chief Justice Rabner questioned the constitutionality of a law that “infringes on the rights of all voting-age residents in more than a third of the state’s localities, for no apparent legitimate purpose,” and its ability to be tailored to legitimate state interests. \(^{203}\)

Chief Justice Rabner then made his position clear: the residency requirement does not impose “a minimal burden” on voters; it is not tailored to advance legitimate state interests; and it is “not clear that the restriction can be saved by as-applied challenges that a quarter of the electorate could bring.” \(^{204}\) The Chief Justice proposed multiple solutions to this problem: judicial surgery—akin to the majority opinion, or as a

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198. *Id.* (emphasis added).
199. *In re Contest II*, 40 A.3d at 718 (Rabner, C.J., dissenting).
200. *Id.* at 715.
201. *Id.* at 715–16 (emphasis added).
202. *Id.* at 717.
203. *Id.*
204. *Id.* (emphasis added).
“better course,” “stri[ki]ng down the residency requirement insofar as it applies to people who have been moved out of their home district through the re-apportionment process, but otherwise leave the restriction intact.” However, Chief Justice Rabner admitted that it was not necessary to resolve his disputes with the law, as the matter was not squarely presented in In re Contest II.

**D. The 2011 Re-apportionment Process**

The In re Contest II court suggested that the parties “apply to the federal district court . . . in order to resolve lingering conflicts that exist between our declaration of the constitutionality of article IV, section 1, paragraph 2 of the New Jersey Constitution and the injunction,” so the New Jersey Attorney General did just that—in Robertson II. Intervening parties included those who could have been affected by the residency requirement specifically during the then-recent 2011 re-apportionment process, perfecting the challenge that Chief Justice Rabner pointed to in his In re Contest II dissent.

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205. In re Contest II, 40 A.3d at 717–18 (emphasis added).

206. Id. at 718. The plurality responded to Chief Justice Rabner’s hypotheticals, suggesting that the possibility of an as-applied challenge via re-apportionment “is not relevant in a facial challenge, no matter the test that is employed,” is “not present in this record,” and is not “the basis of Mosquera’s as-applied challenge.” Id. at 705. The plurality also found Chief Justice Rabner’s argument to question, but never declare, the requirement constitutional or unconstitutional on its face, and that his “facts’ regarding a potential re-apportionment problem” to simply not be in the record to decide. Id. at 705–06.

207. Id. at 689 (majority opinion); see also Robertson v. Bartels, 890 F. Supp. 2d 519 (D.N.J. 2012). In re Contest II stated clearly—and correctly—that it could not dissolve the Robertson I injunction. 40 A.3d at 689. It was also suggested that the parties petition the United States Supreme Court for certiorari, but neither party chose to do so, likely because the district court avenue was easier for the New Jersey Attorney General, and the In re Contest court allowed the Democratic Party in Camden and Gloucester counties to name someone to the now-vacant seat, paving the way for Ms. Mosquera to be appointed and practically speaking, allowing Ms. Mosquera’s desired result to occur. See id.; Editorial, Mosquera Case: She Loses, But . . . , Gloucester County Times (Feb. 17, 2012), www.nj.com/gloucester/voices/index.ssf/2012/02/mosquera_case_she_loses_but.html (“Gabriela Mosquera and her Democratic supporters still may have won a half loaf (and, probably, half a two-year term).”). Some, however, believed the case was destined for the United States Supreme Court. See Donald Scarinci, New Jersey Residency Requirements May Be Destined for the Supreme Court: Part I, PolitickerNJ (July 24, 2012), http://www.politickernj.com/dscarinci/58661/new-jersey-residency-requirements-may-be-destined-supreme-court-part-i (“The U[nited] S[tates] Supreme Court may ultimately consider what could be the most dramatic change in New Jersey politics since federal candidates were permitted to be bracketed with candidates for state and local office [an appeal of In re Contest II].”).

208. See supra note 15.
noted at the outset that its opinion was an “articulate recital of the reasons why [it] disagree[d] with Robertson [I]’s conclusion,” however, despite its “scholarly discussion,” Robertson II found that it amounted to an “improper collateral attack” on the Robertson I injunction and therefore could not serve as a basis for vacating the injunction. 209

In further mandating that the residency requirement be subjected to heightened scrutiny, the Robertson II court stated that the inquiry in the matter was “whether the challenged restriction unfairly or unnecessarily burdens the availability of political opportunity.” 210 The court pointed out that both parties conceded that the re-apportionment process “displaces approximately one-third of New Jersey’s residents from their previous legislative districts,” and, because it occurs seven months prior to the general election, deprives such residents of “the opportunity to satisfy the one-year residency requirement for that electorate’s district.” 211

In applying heightened scrutiny, the court found that, as to the state’s proffered interests: during re-apportionment years, the . . . residency requirement cannot possibly serve to ensure either the prospective constituency’s familiarity with a candidate, the candidate’s familiarity with the constituency, or prevent political carpetbagging, when the constituency has only existed for seven months. 212 In fact, the court noted, upholding the residency requirements during such years may “perversely result in carpetbagging” contrary to the state’s proffered interests in situations “where a substantial portion of an incumbent’s

209. Robertson v. Bartels, 890 F. Supp. 519, 528 (D.N.J. 2012). The Editorial Board of the New Jersey Law Journal noted that it was interesting, if not a shame, for a district court judge to be voicing criticism of the New Jersey Supreme Court. Editorial, Federalism and the Legislature, N.J. L.J., July 16, 2012, at 22, 23. The Editorial Board noted that “[s]tate judges simply cannot ‘destroy the rights acquired’ in federal judgments and preclude reliance on law ‘settled for ten years in determining whether or not [candidates] are eligible to run’ for the New Jersey State Senate or General Assembly . . . .” and that “the lesson of Mosquera’s candidacy and the litigation it begot” may very well be that “[w]hile state courts can interpret the [F]ederal [C]onstitution and federal statutes, they cannot vacate federal injunctions whether rightly or wrongly issued . . . .” Id. at 23. Chief Justice Rabner also previewed this issue in his dissent in In re Contest II: “[T]he Secretary of State and the Attorney General are still subject to a federal injunction that bars them from enforcing the residency requirement, yet they are expected to enforce the majority’s ruling as well. The majority recognizes that untenable situation and encourages the parties to take appropriate action in federal court.” 40 A.3d at 722.

210. Robertson II, 890 F. Supp. 519, 530 (D.N.J. 2012) (quoting Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 964 (1982)). The court also distinguished its facts from those in the Lewis cases, because the in-district requirement “substantially limits the candidate pool during re-districting years, and, in turn, the fundamental right to vote for the candidate of one’s choice.” Id.

211. Id.

212. Id. at 531 (emphasis added).
constituents are re-apportioned into a different district" or when an incumbent’s "residence is placed in a different legislative district from that of her constituents."\textsuperscript{213} In such cases, the incumbent cannot move with her constituents because she will not satisfy the residency requirement; if she runs in her new district, she will represent a constituency that is unfamiliar with her, and vice-versa.\textsuperscript{214}

The Robertson II court also did away with In re Contest II’s characterization of Robertson I: that the court did not take into account the “venerable heritage” of the New Jersey Constitution; for instance, Robertson II acknowledged that the residency requirement dated back to 1776, but noted that, in 1966—obviously a more recent date—the term “district” was substituted for “county” in order to satisfy re-apportionment requirements stemming from Baker v. Carr.\textsuperscript{215} Thus, prior to 1966, no one in the state could possibly "contemplate that a [L]egislator or candidate could be moved arbitrarily from one political subdivision to another as a result of re-[a]pportionment."\textsuperscript{216}

In view of this, Robertson II refused to dissolve the injunction, but—as requested by the Interveners—amended the injunction’s scope to enjoin the New Jersey Attorney General and Secretary of State from enforcing the residency requirement only during re-apportionment years.\textsuperscript{217} Thereafter, the New Jersey Attorney General appealed the Robertson II court’s decision, but interestingly, dropped its appeal shortly after the November 2012 elections.\textsuperscript{218}

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{213}] Id.; see infra Section IV-A.
\item[\textsuperscript{214}] Robertson II, 890 F. Supp. 519, 523 (D.N.J. 2012). The Robertson II court also took the position that such invalidating factors could happen not just to incumbent Legislators, but to prospective candidates as well. Id. at 532.
\item[\textsuperscript{215}] Id. at 532–33. The court also did away with other arguments by the State that this matter was similar to Chimento or Sununu by stating that, unlike an inter-state requirement, the intra-state requirement here “unquestionably relates to their district level responsibilities . . . [because] the very basis of that requirement is to ensure that . . . [that district’s] electorate is sufficiently familiar with its representative, and vice versa.” Id. at 532.
\item[\textsuperscript{216}] Id. at 533. The court noted that the census process of re-apportionment prior to 1966 “merely changed the number of representatives per [c]ounty.” Id. at 533 n.11.
\item[\textsuperscript{217}] Id. at 534.
\item[\textsuperscript{218}] The Philadelphia Inquirer reported the initial appeal to the Third Circuit. See James Osborne, New Jersey’s Candidate-Residency Rule is Again the Subject of a Legal Fight, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Oct. 25, 2012), http://articles.philly.com/2012-10-25/news/34709180_1_residency-rule-residencyrequirement-federal-court (“A decade after a federal court judge ordered New Jersey to stop enforcing a controversial residency requirement for state legislative candidates, Attorney General Jeffrey S. Chiesa is fighting to reinstitute it.”). However, less than a month after the November 2012 elections—where Gabriela Mosquera was re-elected, so to speak—the New Jersey Attorney General dropped its appeal. See Matt Friedman, AG’s Office Drops Effort to Keep Obscure District Residency
V. Practical Solutions and Recommendations for Future Challengers

This recent line of litigation caused New Jersey’s residency requirement to be roundly criticized in the public sphere, notably by newspapers’ editorial boards. The New Jersey Law Journal, in particular, took note of the In re Contest litigation and remarked:

Stepping back, the question about the application of durational residency requirements for legislative candidates is a nonpartisan, extremely important question of public policy for New Jersey . . . . But are the durational time periods chosen in such a different era as 1844 still serving the citizens of New Jersey, or are they inhibiting our electoral process? We call on the Legislature, [A]ttorney [G]eneral, [S]ecretary of [S]tate and [G]overnor, together with the political parties, to engage in a dialogue about the current efficacy of these residency requirements. There is no


219. See Editorial, Rigors of Residency, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Feb. 19, 2012), http://articles.philly.com/2012-02-19/news/31077371_1_residency-democratic-state-senator-confirmation-hearing (detailing the challenges of public life and residency requirements, and noting that, if Gabriela Mosquera had been running for federal office rather than state office, her residency would not have mattered because “[f]ederal law lets lawmakers represent places they don’t live in”); Editorial, N.J. Should Change Candidate-Residency Law, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Jan. 26, 2012), http://articles.philly.com/2012-01-26/news/30667122_1_residency-requirement-residency-rule-state-constitution (criticizing the rationale behind challenging Gabriela Mosquera’s residency after her election win, and demanding that the New Jersey Legislature “address the constitutional validity of the residency rule” after the Robertson I decision was left in place for ten years); Editorial, Partisan N.J. Lieutenant Governor Should Not Rule on Which Candidates Make the Ballot, STAR LEDGER (Sept. 19, 2011), http://blog.nj.com/njv_editorial_page/2011/09/partisan_nj_lt_governor_should.html (criticizing the fact that the Lieutenant Governor can interpret and enforce the residency requirement for candidates); Editorial, Put Lewis on the Ballot and Let Voters Decide, STAR LEDGER (Apr. 29, 2011), http://blog.nj.com/njv_editorial_page/2011/04/put_lewis_on_the_ballot_and_le.html (“Lewis’[s] residency is sketchy, but disqualifying him could leave the Democrats without a candidate. That injures voters. In cases of ambiguity, the court should side with the candidate.”).
need to wait for continued litigation, which often becomes moot in the appellate process in our state.\textsuperscript{220}

I conclude that, following the litigation that has plagued New Jersey’s political process over the last decade, it remains prudent to continue to keep intact the in-state requirement for candidates for public office—four years for Senators and two years for Assembly members.\textsuperscript{221} The legitimate interests of the state are at their highest when dealing with candidates that come from out-of-state to run without having been a part of the locality, let alone the state as a whole. Aside from the public policy arguments, the United States Supreme Court has summarily affirmed \textit{Chimento} and \textit{Sununu}, and courts are rightfully reluctant to disobey those decisions despite their lack of findings on the merits. However, because of the complexities during re-apportionment years, including the still-untested ability to mount a perfected challenge of the requirement on equal protection grounds, I believe that the in-district requirement needs to be amended. Specifically, as a small iota of change, the provision should be amended to read that its requirement is lifted during such years for those candidates or incumbents whose municipalities are re-apportioned out of their resident district, but then move back to their original district in order to run, or who choose to run in their newly-apportioned district. Our political, judicial, and social systems demand as such. Using the 2011 re-apportionment process as an example, it is easy to see the practical—and astonishingly partisan—consequences that the process has on the in-district residency requirement, especially for sitting Legislators. Such a change would bring immense satisfaction to prospective candidates, sitting Legislators, political parties, and the judicial system—and would keep the hands of the appointed from determining the elected.

\textbf{A. New Jersey Incumbent Legislators That Could Have Brought Perfected Challenges to the Intra-District Requirement in 2011}

As Chief Justice Rabner pointed out in \textit{In re Contest II}, the re-apportionment process that affected 190 out of 566 New Jersey municipalities in 2011 ended on April 3, 2011—roughly seven months
prior to the November 8, 2011 general election. This partisan process created “casualties” of re-apportionment: incumbent Legislators who have fallen out of favor with one party or another, whose municipalities are moved into districts unfavorable to their views, or political parties under the guise of re-apportionment. This resulted in Legislators retiring, rather than run in elections that were unwinnable from the start, or—significant for challenging the residency requirement—moving back to municipalities that remained in their original districts or attempting to run in their newly-apportioned districts.


223. See Max Pizarro, Breaking: Rosenthal Chooses Democratic Map, POLITICKERNJ (Apr. 2, 2011), http://www.politickernj.com/46423/breaking-rosenthal-chooses-democratic-map. For example, Assemblyman Reed Gusciora, whose resident municipality of Princeton was moved from the Fifteenth Legislative District to the more conservative Sixteenth Legislative District, reacted to the move by the re-apportionment committee by stating: “I’ve often bucked against my party. This was an opportunity for them to even the score, I guess.” Sulaiman Abdur-Rahman, N.J. Redistricting Proposal Could Doom Political Career of Gay State Lawmaker Reed Gusciora, TRENTONIAN (Apr. 2, 2011), http://www.trentonian.com/article/TT/20110402/NEWSS/304029987. Likewise, it was reported that Senator John Girgenti, whose municipality of Hawthorne was moved from the Thirty-fifth Legislative District to the Thirty-eighth Legislative District—a district already represented by another Democratic Senator—was considered “expendable,” after he voted against the Democratic Party’s “marriage equality” bill in 2009. See Winners and Losers: Week of April 4th, POLITICKERNJ (Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.politickernj.com/46673/winners-and-losers; see also Redistricting Postmortem, Ten Takeaways, POLITICKERNJ (Apr. 22, 2011), http://www.politickernj.com/47045/redistricting-takeaways.

Those whose resident municipalities were apportioned to new districts and chose to move back into their original districts in order to run included the following Legislators:


- Twenty-eighth District Assemblyman Ralph R. Caputo’s resident municipality of Belleville was apportioned into the Twenty-ninth District, so he moved back to the Twenty-eighth District municipality of Nutley to represent the remaining 83% of his original constituents.\footnote{See Matt Friedman, \textit{At Least Three N.J. Lawmakers Plan to Move Because of New Legislative District Map}, STAR LEDGER (Apr. 7, 2011), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/04/at_least_3_nj_lawmakers_plan_t.html; \textit{see also New Jersey State Legislative District Comparison, supra note 225.}}

Those whose resident municipalities were apportioned into new districts and chose to run in those new districts were the following:

- Twelfth District Senator Jennifer Beck’s resident municipality of Red Bank was apportioned into the Eleventh District, where she then represented 39% of her original constituents;

- Twelfth District Assemblywoman Caroline Casagrande’s resident municipality of Colts Neck was apportioned into the Eleventh District, where she then represented 39% of her original constituents;

- Eleventh District Assemblyman David P. Rible’s resident municipality of Wall Township was apportioned into the Thirtieth District, where he then represented 26% of his original constituents;

- Eleventh District Senator Sean T. Kean’s resident municipality of Wall Township was apportioned into the Thirtieth District (where he then ran for Assembly), where he then represented 26% of his original constituents;

- Thirteenth District Assemblyman Samuel D. Thompson’s resident municipality of Old Bridge was apportioned into the Twelfth District (where he then ran for Senate), where he then represented 13% of his original constituents;
Fourth District Assemblyman Domenick DiCicco, Jr.’s resident municipality of Franklin Township was apportioned into the Third District, where he then ran in order to represent 30% of his original constituents (though he lost).\textsuperscript{227}

If the one-year-in-district provision was read strictly, then none of these incumbent Legislators could possibly have complied with the provision during the re-apportionment years. Indeed, they would have only been in their districts for seven months prior to the November 2011 general election, and through no fault of their own, would have violated article I, section 1, paragraph 2 of the New Jersey Constitution. This is where re-apportionment and residency clash in a way that most likely violates equal protection on a strict or intermediate scrutiny standard, and these standards call out for constitutional revision. In the meantime, come the next re-apportionment cycle, incumbent Legislators may validly rely upon \textit{Robertson II} and Chief Justice Rabner’s \textit{In re Contest II} dissent to ward off challenges to their legitimate candidacy.

In affixing the proper standard, courts should simply look to cases in which residency and re-apportionment have mixed, and utilize a heightened scrutiny standard. When dealing with these sorts of challenges, courts relying upon \textit{Robertson II} will ask the question from \textit{Clements}: “whether the challenged restriction unfairly or unnecessarily burdens the availability of political opportunity.”\textsuperscript{228} However, even those relying upon \textit{In re Contest II} may apply strict scrutiny by way of \textit{Dunn} and \textit{Bullock} “when operation of the durational requirement has a ‘real and appreciable impact’ on the exercise of the franchise [of candidacy].”\textsuperscript{229} \textit{Robertson II} and Chief Justice Rabner both found that during these years, “it is undisputed that re-apportionment displaces approximately one-third of New Jersey’s residents from their previous districts” and because re-apportionment occurs roughly seven months prior to the

\begin{quote}
\textsuperscript{227} See Brief for Plaintiffs-Interveners at 5–6, Robertson v. Bartels, 890 F. Supp. 2d 519 (D.N.J. 2012) (No. 01-2024); \textit{NEW JERSEY STATE LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT COMPARISON}, supra note 225; see also Max Pizarro, \textit{Rerouted Thompson in Pursuit of Senate Seat}, POLITICKERNJ.COM (Apr. 4, 2011), http://www.politickernj.com/46455/thompson-pursue-senate-seat; Statehouse Bureau Staff, \textit{N.J. Legislative Elections Results: Democrats Fend off GOP Funding, Christie Campaigning}, STAR LEDGER (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2011/11/nj_legislative_elections_resul.html (“The Democrats’ sole gain came thanks to re[-]districting. Assemblyman Domenick DiCicco (R-Gloucester), the only Republican to win a Democrat-held seat two years ago, was shifted into a district with two Democratic incumbents and immediately faced an uphill battle to stay in the Legislature. He lost by about 3,500 votes . . . .”).
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election, candidates whose residences are moved cannot satisfy the requirement in any district.\(^{230}\) The operation of the requirement during these particular years, then, certainly “has a ‘real and appreciable impact’ on the franchise” of candidacy in New Jersey.\(^ {231}\) As Robertson II found strict scrutiny to apply in such matters, courts may then shift to ask whether the residency requirement “is justified by a compelling government interest and is narrowly drawn to serve that interest.”\(^ {232}\) However, even if the Matthews intermediate standard is applied, the residency requirement must be “reasonably and suitably tailored to further legitimate governmental objectives.”\(^ {233}\)

After first applying either scrutiny level, courts must then apply that particular level to New Jersey’s proffered legitimate state interests: a candidate’s ability to understand the electorate’s needs and desires, the electorate’s ability to familiarize itself with a candidate, and the prevention of political carpetbagging. Robertson II was correct in finding that during re-apportionment years, these interests—compelling or important—could not possibly be served with the enforcement or utilization of the residency provision.\(^ {234}\) As one can see from the districts’ shifts and the candidacies of the various incumbent Legislators whose municipalities moved districts and then chose to run, it is seemingly impossible to justify exactly how a candidate could better familiarize himself or herself with a constituency that existed for less time than the requirement, and how voters in that particular constituency could familiarize themselves with the candidate. This is particularly galling when, like Robertson I opined, one looks to the extreme end-of-the-spectrum municipalities of Newark and Jersey City: the district lines “run down the middle of streets and through the heart of local neighborhoods,” and re-apportionment does nothing more than change these lines.\(^ {235}\) Moreover, when an incumbent Legislator is kept in his or her district, but the district is a shell of his or her former constituency, the proffered interest in maintaining the residency requirement for the purpose of knowing one’s constituents is left moot.\(^ {236}\)

The prevention of “political carpetbagging” rationale is likely the easiest to cast aside during re-apportionment years,\(^ {237}\) as re-

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232. Id. (citation omitted).
233. In re Contest II, 40 A.3d at 717 (citation omitted).
234. See Robertson II, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 351.
235. Id. (citing Robertson v. Bartels, 150 F. Supp. 2d 691, 697 (D.N.J. 2001)).
236. Id. at 531.
237. Chief Justice Rabner opined that “concerns of carpetbagging do not exist” during these years. In re Contest II, 40 A.3d at 717 (Rabner, J., dissenting). The Martin
apportionment itself often promotes political carpetbagging, or forces incumbents to move in order to not be viewed as carpetbaggers. For example, looking to New Jersey’s Eleventh and Twelfth Districts—whose representatives prior to re-districting only represented a fraction of their constituencies, but then were subsequently allowed to run and ended up staying in office—a valid argument could be made for carpetbagging: for the sole reason that it was presumptively assumed that they would succeed in a changing political district, but had not fully represented the district for the full year. However, it was through no fault of their own that their “carpetbagging” occurred! It also goes without saying that, in such instances, the “familiarity” interest cannot possibly be served.

Using the examples of Assemblymen Gusciora and Caputo, who were familiar with the vast portion of their newly-created district (86% in the case of Gusciora, and 83% in the case of Caputo), but whose municipalities were re-apportioned out of their district, these Legislators’ inability to run in their former districts flies in the face of the familiarity and carpetbagging interests. Moving their residences to their previously-represented district, in fact, promotes the familiarity interest to allow them to do as much. Moreover, should they have decided to run in their newly-formed districts, where they would have represented 14% and 17% of their former constituents, respectively, political carpetbagging would be present—again, through no fault of their own.

When dealing with this exact issue of carpetbagging, the Supreme Court of California in Wenke found that moving back into the original district in the way of Assemblymen Gusciora and Caputo met the state’s proffered interests because “[the candidate] will undoubtedly be familiar with [his or her former district’s] problems and needs—certainly as much as the candidate who by fortuity remains in the district unaffected by the change in boundaries.” Furthermore, to not allow Gusciora or Caputo to run would “thwart the democratic process” by forcing them to run to represent a constituency with which they have little to no familiarity.

New Jersey’s Constitution therefore calls out for revision, given that, court noted that, like these Legislators, “[t]he petitioners did not move away from their districts; their districts moved away from them.” Martin v. Jones, 414 S.E.2d 445, 447 (W. Va. 1992); Brief for Plaintiffs-Interveners at 21–34, Robertson v. Bartels, 890 F. Supp. 2d 519 (D.N.J. 2012) (No. 01-2024).


239. See Robertson II, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 531 (“Had [Gusciora] chosen to remain . . . in the [Sixteenth] District, he would have remained relatively unfamiliar with the electorate and could arguably be accused of carpetbagging.”).


241. Id.; see also Robertson II, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 531.
during re-apportionment years, a strict reading of the residency requirement could potentially prevent an incumbent—or really, any candidate whose residence is placed in a new district—from running in either her new or old district because of a failure to meet the one-year requirement. Because this clash of two requirements “infringes on the rights of all voting-age residents in more than a third of the State’s localities, for no apparent purpose,” much like the Supreme Court of West Virginia in Martin opined, New Jersey “invites outrageous and destructive political maneuvering every ten years,” contrary to the intentions of the state and will of the people. As the re-apportionment commission is a partisan body, and consequently the results retain partisan elements, allowing the residency requirement to continue in such a strict manner only serves to destroy our democratic system. The “outrageous and destructive political maneuvering” is supplanted by not allowing relief for those Legislators, such as Gusciora, who were considered “casualties” of re-apportionment, to correct their own misfortune by moving back into their respective districts. This also has an appreciable effect on the voters of the district. For instance, Gusciora had represented voters in the Fifteenth District for over a decade; by not allowing him to move back to continue his representation, the voters would have been deprived of a competent and familiar Legislator who they had elected and re-elected time and time again. Undermining the electoral process in such a way has deep roots in equal protection law, and these scenarios may properly be considered a violation.

242. See Robertson II, 890 F. Supp. 2d at n.9; In re Contest II, 40 A.3d at 715–16 (Rabner, J., dissenting) (noting that during re-apportionment years, “not a single adult resident in roughly one-third of the State’s localities could run for [public office], or vote for a neighbor who wanted to run, under the strict terms of the residency requirement”).

243. See In re Contest II, 40 A.3d at 717 (Rabner, J., dissenting); Martin, 414 S.E.2d at 447.

244. See N.J. CONST. art IV, § 3, ¶ 1 (“the Senate districts and Assembly districts shall be established, and the senators and members of the General Assembly shall be apportioned among them, by an Apportionment Commission consisting of ten members, five to be appointed by the chairman of the State committee of each of the two political parties whose candidates for Governor receive the largest number of votes at the most recent gubernatorial election”). The 2011 redistricting process was so acrimonious that the commission delegates from the two political parties were forced to certify to Chief Justice Rabner that they would be unable to “certify such establishment and appointment to the Secretary of State on or before the date fixed” so that he could appoint a tie-breaker: the late Rutgers University professor Alan Rosenthal. See id. at art. IV, § 3, ¶ 2; Max Pizarro, Rabner Uses Redistricting Tiebreaker Case as an Example of His Problem-Solving Ability, POLITICKERNJ (June 16, 2014), http://www.politickernj.com/74351/rabner-uses-redistricting-tiebreaker-case-example-his-problem-solving-ability.

245. See Robertson II, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 532; Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 144 (1972) (ballot access with a “real and appreciable impact on the exercise of the franchise”
Moreover, as seen from its history, the framers of New Jersey's Constitution never envisioned that re-apportionment would impact the residency requirement because it was not until 1966 that "a [L]egislator or candidate could be moved arbitrarily from one political subdivision to another as a result of re-apportionment." As Robertson II noted and as the proceedings of the various New Jersey Constitutions confirm, "re[-]apportionment up to 1966 merely changed the number of representatives per county" and could not possibly have moved candidates inter-district. Indeed, candidates were to represent counties, whose boundaries never changed, rather than political districts. The residency requirement, therefore, could never strike down a candidacy based on political fortunes or misfortunes, but rather, could only strike down a candidacy based on the will of the individual candidate or incumbent Legislator to move his or her residence.

In fact, as seen from the relevant constitutional revisions, while the residency requirement has remained within the New Jersey Constitution since 1776, the potential for re-apportionment to clash with a candidate's residency only dates back to 1966. The In re Contest II court made a valid point on this matter: "New Jersey's voters, as recently as 1966, reaffirmed that candidates for General Assembly should live with the voters they seek to represent for at least one year before the election." However, in so proposing the amendments to the voters, nothing in the proceedings of the 1966 one-person, one-vote amendments suggests any sort of change to the residency requirement. Rather, the change of "counties" to "districts" came—without discussion by the framers—from a technical amendment, not a debated change of the historical precedent of candidates living with their potential constituencies. The people of New Jersey, therefore, did indeed ratify what In re Contest II's states, but seemingly without the understanding by the framers or by the people of

may be violative of equal protection); Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 964 (1982) (finding that when a restriction "unfairly or unnecessarily burdens the availability of political opportunity," the restriction may be violative of equal protection). See generally Brief for Plaintiffs-Interveners, Robertson v. Bartels, 890 F. Supp. 2d 519 (D.N.J. 2012) (No. 01-2024).

247. Id. at 533 n.11.
248. In re Contest II, 40 A.3d at 702.
such a clash between residency and re-apportionment, which had never before occurred.\textsuperscript{250}

Therefore, in light of the aforementioned fallacies, candidates whose residency is affected by re-apportionment—and re-apportionment only—may validly challenge the requirement, insofar as their candidacy itself is challenged. The interests asserted by the State cannot meet the strict scrutiny standard under \textit{Dunn} or even the intermediate scrutiny under \textit{Matthews}. However, as a practical matter, the \textit{Robertson II} injunction stands, and barring another state court decision, the Attorney General and Secretary of State will comply.\textsuperscript{251} Once again, however, this matter should not be constrained by the limited authority of the courts, but should be taken up by the Legislature as a constitutional amendment to prevent further widespread confusion every ten years, and to head-off action by the state courts, which have yet to deal with a direct challenge to the residency requirement and re-apportionment process after \textit{In re Contest II} and \textit{Robertson II}.

\textbf{B. Challengers Whose Residency is Not Affected By Re-Apportionment Will Not Find Relief From the Courts}

Aside from the perfected challenge to the residency requirement during re-apportionment years, challengers will likely not be able to find relief from the courts if they fail to meet the one-year-in-district requirement, or the in-state requirement. Moreover, those requirements, which have been maintained in the New Jersey Constitution for decades, still serve the purpose that they always have, and will not be held to a heightened standard under an equal protection analysis. Finally, for purposes of prospective candidate knowledge, the Secretary of State and the Attorney General can now enforce this provision and let candidates know about its enforcement with the tightened restriction of the scope of the \textit{Robertson II} injunction re-apportionment.\textsuperscript{252}

First, those candidates who come from out-of-state to run for public office in New Jersey must still comply with the state and in-district residency provisions in order to run. This was delineated by \textit{Lewis IV}, which re-affirmed a facial challenge to residency requirements in \textit{Sununu}

\textsuperscript{250} When dealing with an analogous requirement and situation, the \textit{Martin} court found that the drafters of the West Virginia Constitution “never envisaged this situation where a technical impediment would prevent serving [L]egislators from continuing to represent their own constituents or prevent challengers in like circumstances from filing.” 414 S.E.2d at 447.

\textsuperscript{251} \textit{See Robertson II}, 890 F. Supp. 2d at 534.

\textsuperscript{252} \textit{Id.}
and *Chimento*, and all but did away with as-applied challenges to the four-year state residency requirement for candidates for the State Senate.\textsuperscript{253} *Lewis IV* would apply just as much to those running for the General Assembly, as the interests remain the same, albeit the time period is shorter. When dealing with as-applied equal protection challenges, the Third Circuit has adopted the principle that, in deciding whether the application of the constitutional provision is violative, the proper question is “whether the application of the constitutional provision . . . deprive[s] [the candidate] of a constitutional right [under the particular circumstances of this case].”\textsuperscript{254} However, in dealing with facial challenges, the courts may properly look to *Sununu* and *Chimento* for further validation of in-state residency requirements, since the United States Supreme Court has yet to hold otherwise, and their summary affirmances are the closest thing the judiciary has to a solidified ruling in these circumstances.

Although *Sununu* and *Chimento* provide that for facial equal protection challenges to in-state residency requirements for candidates, and *Dunn* can be utilized as the proper standard of review, both *Sununu* and *Chimento* found that the residency requirement was constitutionally tailored to the legitimate state objectives, as seen *supra*.\textsuperscript{255} That is, the residency restriction for out-of-state candidates is tailored to ensuring that residents of the political districts are familiar with someone who recently moved in from out-of-state. Certainly, political carpetbagging is the most important interest, and easiest to abuse without such a provision. Indeed, although Mr. Lewis had lived in New Jersey for most of his life, he had recently lived in California—had he never lived in New

\textsuperscript{253} Lewis v. Guadagno, 445 F. App’x 599, 604 n.5 (3d. Cir. 2011). Interestingly, the Third Circuit remarked that Mr. Lewis could not “point to a similarly situated person who, having voted as a citizen of another state less than three years before a general election in New Jersey, was deemed eligible to run for statewide office.” *Id.* at 602. However, Mr. Edward Forchion, also known as the “NJ Weedman,” was certified to run for office in the same district as Mr. Lewis as an independent candidate, but his candidacy went unchallenged and unnoticed by Mr. Lewis’s counsel. Colleen O’Dea, *Fight Over Residency Leaves Assembly With Vacant Seat*, NJSPOTLIGHT.COM (Jan. 13, 2012), \textit{http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/12/0112/2329/}. It was later found that Mr. Forchion had moved to Los Angeles, California three years earlier, and Mr. Lewis’s counsel stated that “had he known about [Mr.] Forchion’s residency at the time, and that he was allowed on the ballot, the courts may have allowed Lewis on the ballot as well.” *Id.*; see also Joelle Farrell, *Most Legal Work for Lewis’[s] N.J. Senate Bid Provided Free*, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER (Oct. 25, 2011), \textit{http://articles.philly.com/2011-10-25/news/ 30320483_1_contribution-limits-lewis-case-new-jersey-senate}.

\textsuperscript{254} *Lewis IV*, 445 F. App’x at 602.

Jersey before, he could certainly have been characterized as a political carpetbagger attempting to capitalize on his celebrity to run for office.256 Furthermore, Lewis IV and Chimento found that the in-state residency requirement imposes only “minimal burdens” on candidates seeking office—such as a short waiting period, rather than an infringement on a constitutionally protected right.257 Finally, as the requirement has gone relatively unaltered in the New Jersey Constitution, and is unaffected by re-apportionment years, the cause for change is lacking. Thus, because of the courts’ broad-based acceptance of such requirements, there is not a pressing need for New Jerseyans to revisit this issue in the constitution, nor is there a need for courts to do anything further. Candidates, however, must ensure that they meet this requirement, especially now that Robertson II has limited the scope of its injunction and clarified the years to which it applies.258

Next, to those candidates who move their residency intra-state during years other than re-apportionment years, Robertson II has now accepted the idea that the residency requirement will bar such candidates from running, which In re Contest II certainly reaffirmed.259 Courts have decided that the Matthews intermediate standard applies to these matters, or that other lower court opinions provide sufficient guidance to ensure its tailored ability to fulfill legitimate state interests.260 Thus, without a stipulation that their residences were moved due to re-apportionment, candidates who move out of their resident municipality, through their own free will, less than one year before the general election, will have their candidacy barred with valid backing. Furthermore, the New Jersey Constitution’s long history of ratifying and re-ratifying this requirement suggests that the people are not ready to have it repealed. This was certainly the New Jersey Supreme Court’s take in declining to “abrogate our 235 year-old [s]tate [c]onstitution’s requirement.”261

256. Lewis IV, 445 F. App’x at 602. Celebrities have, in other instances, been branded carpetbaggers when moving into a state to run for political office. For example, actress Ashley Judd, a Tennessee resident, may decide to challenge United States Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell for a United States Senate seat in her childhood home state of Kentucky, although she has lived in Tennessee for years. See Roger Alford, Ashley Judd May Need to Decide Soon on Senate Race, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Mar. 5, 2013), http://www.denverpost.com/recommended/ci_22722354. Republican groups have mocked her for having her residence in Tennessee. Id.
257. Lewis IV, 445 F. App’x at 603; Chimento, 353 F. Supp. at 1215–16.
258. Robertson II, 890 F. Supp. 2d. at 534.
259. Id.; In re Contest II, 40 A.3d at 713.
261. In re Contest II, 40 A.3d at 688–89.
VI. CONCLUSION

With the recent litigation that has plagued the New Jersey state and federal court system, New Jersey’s constitutional in-district residency requirement seems here to stay, except during years in which the decennial re-apportionment occurs. During those years, equal protection concerns compelled the court in Robertson v. Bartels II to strike down the provision, and limit the scope of its injunction to only those years. This was a wise choice by the federal district court, but one that need not wait for other decisions in contradiction. The New Jersey Legislature should take action in the form of a constitutional amendment to alleviate the requirement during such years. This would prevent confusion among candidates, Legislators, political parties, and the courts. Otherwise, the in-district residency requirement plays an important role in our state’s political discourse to ensure that candidates are aware of their constituents’ issues, concerns, and ideas. Change is needed, but small increments of alteration will go a long way towards ensuring a streamlined, principled state legislature and pool of candidates for such offices.