ROBINSON TOWNSHIP v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA: EXAMINATION AND IMPLICATIONS

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INTRODUCTION

In Robinson Township v. Commonwealth, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held unconstitutional major parts of Pennsylvania’s “Act 13”—a 2012 oil and gas law designed to facilitate the development of natural gas from Marcellus Shale. In so doing, the court breathed new life into article I, section 27 of Pennsylvania’s constitution, which creates public rights in certain environmental amenities and requires the state to “conserve and maintain” public resources “for the benefit of all the people.” The wide-ranging implications of this decision will be felt for years, perhaps decades.

This Article provides a brief introduction to the three players in this drama—article I, section 27, Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights Amendment; Act 13; and the lower court decision in Robinson Township. It then drills deep into the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s remarkable determination that Act 13 is unconstitutional. Last, it places Robinson Township into context by considering its implications going forward,
including at the local, state, and global levels in general, and in the
context of environmental constitutionalism in particular.

I. BRIEF BACKGROUND TO PENNSYLVANIA’S ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
AMENDMENT, ACT 13, AND ROBINSON TOWNSHIP

A. The Environmental Rights Amendment

As part of the environmental movement that swept the United States
in the 1960s and 1970s, more than a dozen states amended their
constitutions to include some provision for the environment.\(^4\)
Pennsylvania was one of them. Article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, known as the “Environmental Rights Amendment,”
provides:

The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the
preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic
values of the environment. Pennsylvania’s public natural
resources are the common property of all the people, including
generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources, the
Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit
of all the people.\(^5\)

The Environmental Rights Amendment was adopted in response to
Pennsylvania’s experience with extractive industries and activities.\(^6\) The
Commonwealth has a long and sordid history of coal mining, oil and gas
development, deforestation, industrialization, and attendant loss of
species and habitat. In a strong display of support, the people of
Pennsylvania adopted the Environmental Rights Amendment in a 1971
referendum by a four-to-one margin.\(^7\) The plurality’s understanding of
the Amendment is informed not only by the text of article I, section 27
but by “the occasion and necessity for the provision; the circumstances
under which the amendment was ratified; the mischief to be remedied;

\(^4\) James R. May & Erin Daly, Global Environmental Constitutionalism 209–
35 (2015); James R. May & William Romanowicz, Environmental Rights in State
Constitutions, in Principles in Constitutional Environmental Law 305 (2011); Emily
Zackin, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Why State Constitutions


\(^6\) John C. Dernbach & Edmund J. Sonnenberg, A Legislative History of Article 1,
Section 27 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Widener L.J.

\(^7\) Id. at 71.
the object to be attained; and the contemporaneous legislative history.”

When a constitutional provision has been approved by the electorate, these considerations provide a court with a basis for determining the public’s “common understanding” of its provision.

B. Act 13

Ancient shale strata exist deep below the surface of the earth. These layers of shale embed natural gas in what are known as “plays.” The Marcellus Shale Play is a giant geologic formation beneath Pennsylvania and nearby states. It is thought to contain up to ten percent of available natural gas deposits in North America. The Marcellus Shale Play has been subject to enormous development pressures and concomitant concerns about adverse environmental effects.

Act 13 was adopted to address the massive exploitation of shale gas, and particularly gas from the Marcellus shale layer. Conventional gas—or oil—extraction ordinarily involves drilling for a pool or concentration of oil or gas in particular rock strata. Extraction of gas from Marcellus shale, by contrast, involves what is called unconventional gas development that involves a combination of techniques—horizontal drilling through a shale layer exposes more shale to the wellbore, use of millions of gallons of water and fluids to fracture shale through a process known as hydrofracturing (also known as “fracking” or “fracing”) to release the gas trapped in the shale, and usually involving completion of several wells on a given drilling pad—to produce millions of cubic feet of gas per day.

Pennsylvania enacted one of the nation’s first oil and gas laws, known as the Pennsylvania Oil and Gas Act. This Act, however, was not designed to address unconventional gas development, not to mention

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9. Williams, supra note 8, at 194–95 (quoting People v. Mezy, 551 N.W.2d 389, 393 (Mich. 1996)). The Michigan Supreme Court stated: When construing a constitution, the Court’s task is to “divine the ‘common understanding’ of the provision, that meaning which reasonable minds, the great mass of the people themselves, would give it.” Relevant considerations include the constitutional convention debates, the address to the people, the circumstances leading to the adoption of the provision, and the purpose sought to be accomplished.

Id.
development of the Marcellus Shale Play, thus resulting in a patchwork of regulatory responses by the state as well as local governments.

Accordingly, in 2012 the Pennsylvania legislature revised the Oil and Gas Act with the twin goals of liberalizing the extraction of natural gas from the Marcellus Shale Play and creating a uniform regulatory structure to do so. This revision is commonly called “Act 13” because it was Act 13 of 2012. Act 13 establishes a system for collecting impact fees from unconventional gas development, and allocates much of the revenue from those fees to various municipalities and several state agencies to offset some of the adverse environmental effects of unconventional gas development.\(^\text{10}\) It also contains new or modified permitting requirements for oil and gas operations by the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (“DEP”).\(^\text{11}\) In addition, Act 13 prevents physicians from obtaining information about the risks of exposure to certain chemicals used in hydraulic fracturing unless they agree to sign a confidentiality agreement.\(^\text{12}\) It also subjects physicians who release information about potential chemical exposure to civil and criminal liability.\(^\text{13}\)

Three provisions of Act 13 are central to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s *Robinson Township* decision. First, section 3303 declares that state environmental laws “occupy the entire field” of oil and gas regulation, “to the exclusion of all local ordinances.” Section 3303 also “preempts and supersedes the local regulation of oil and gas operations regulated” under the state’s various environmental laws.\(^\text{14}\)

Second, section 3304 requires “all local ordinances regulating oil and gas operations” to “allow for the reasonable development of oil and gas resources.” In so doing, it imposes uniform rules for unconventional gas development in the state, prohibits local governments from establishing more stringent rules, and establishes limited time periods for local review of drilling proposals.\(^\text{15}\)

Third, section 3215(b) prohibits drilling or disturbing area within specific distances of streams, springs, wetlands, and other water bodies. But section 3215(b)(4) requires DEP to waive these distance restrictions

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11. Id. §§ 3211–3227.
12. Id. § 3222.1.
13. Id. § 3256 (authorizing DEP to assess civil penalties for “a violation of this chapter”); id. § 3255(a) (stating that a “person violating a provision of this chapter commits a summary offense”); id. § 3255(b) (stating that a “person willfully violating a provision of this chapter . . . commits a misdemeanor”). Section 3222.1, which contains the confidentiality requirement, is included within “this chapter.”
14. Id. § 3303.
15. Id. § 3304.
if the permit applicant submits “additional measures, facilities or practices” that it will employ to protect these waters. That provision states: “The waiver, if granted, shall include additional terms and conditions required by [DEP] necessary to protect the waters of this Commonwealth.”

C. Robinson Township v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania: Lower Court Decision

Robinson Township and six other municipalities, two individuals, an environmental organization, and a physician filed an action against the state challenging Act 13 as inconsistent with the Environmental Rights Amendment, substantive due process, and other provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution. In its July 2012 decision, the Commonwealth Court of the State of Pennsylvania dismissed many of the petitioners’ claims but held section 3215(b)(4) and section 3304 to be unconstitutional. President Judge Dan Pellegrini wrote for the four-judge majority; three judges dissented.

The commonwealth court first held the waiver from the setback provision (section 3215(b)(4)) to be invalid under the state constitutional requirement that “legislation must contain adequate standards that will guide and restrain the exercise of the delegated administrative functions . . . .” It held that section 3215(b)(4) violates that requirement because it “gives no guidance to DEP that guide and constrain its discretion to decide to waive the distance requirements from water body and wetland setbacks.”

Next, based on the property rights provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the commonwealth court held invalid as a matter of substantive due process Act 13’s requirement that municipalities approve unconventional gas development (section 3304). For zoning requirements and other laws to satisfy substantive due process, Pennsylvania courts have previously ruled that they “must be directed toward the community as a whole, concerned with the public interest generally, and justified by a balancing of community costs and

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18. Id. at 468, 497.
19. Id. at 490.
20. Id. at 493.
22. Robinson Twp., 52 A.3d at 484–85.
benefits.”

Section 3304 violates substantive due process, the commonwealth court ruled, “because it allows incompatible uses in zoning districts and does not protect the interests of neighboring property owners from harm, alters the character of the neighborhood, and makes irrational classifications.”

The commonwealth court upheld Act 13’s preemption clause (section 3303) under the Environmental Rights Amendment, however. Notwithstanding its bold pronouncements or perhaps because of them, article I, section 27 was mostly marginalized by Pennsylvania courts from the outset. This marginalization took two forms. First, viewing article I, section 27 as a grant of authority to government, Pennsylvania courts developed the view that the Amendment was not self-executing; that is, it applies only when the legislature specifically says so. Second, in Payne v. Kassab, the commonwealth court substituted a three-part balancing test for the text of the Amendment. When the legislature says the Amendment is applicable, that test has since been used by courts in the overwhelming majority of cases involving article I, section 27.

Because of these prior court decisions, the commonwealth court made short work of the claim against section 3303. Because Act 13 relieved municipalities “of their responsibilities to strike a balance between oil

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23. Id. at 483 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Realen Valley Forge Greenes Assocs., 838 A.2d 718, 728 (Pa. 2003)).
24. Id. at 485.
25. Id.
26. The commonwealth court stated:
   The court's role must be to test the decision under review by a threefold standard:
   (1) Was there compliance with all applicable statutes and regulations relevant to the protection of the Commonwealth's public natural resources?
   (2) Does the record demonstrate a reasonable effort to reduce the environmental incursion to a minimum?
   (3) Does the environmental harm which will result from the challenged decision or action so clearly outweigh the benefits to be derived therefrom that to proceed further would be an abuse of discretion?
27. For a more detailed explanation of these two points, see John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously When It Protects the Environment: Part I—An Interpretative Framework for Article I, Section 27, 103 Dick. L. Rev. 693 (1999), and John C. Dernbach, Taking the Pennsylvania Constitution Seriously When It Protects the Environment: Part II—Environmental Rights and Public Trust, 104 Dick. L. Rev. 97 (1999). See also John C. Dernbach, Natural Resources and the Public Estate, in THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION: A TREATISE ON RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 683 (Ken Gormley et al. eds., 2004).
and gas development and environmental concerns," there was no cause of action under article I, section 27, the court ruled.\footnote{Robinson Twp., 52 A.3d at 489.}

The commonwealth court also held that the environmental petitioners and the physician lacked constitutional standing.\footnote{Id. at 476–78.} Both sides appealed to the seven-member Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

II. \textit{ROBINSON TOWNSHIP AND THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT}

In a remarkable decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the commonwealth court’s decision on the two provisions that the commonwealth court had held unconstitutional, and also held section 3303 to be unconstitutional.\footnote{Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 978 (Pa. 2013) (plurality opinion).} In a 162-page plurality opinion, Chief Justice Ronald Castille and two other justices, Debra McIclosey Todd and Seamus McCaffery, grounded their decision in the Environmental Rights Amendment. A fourth justice, Max Baer, concurred in the decision but based his opinion on substantive due process. Justice Thomas Saylor and Justice J. Michael Eakin wrote separate dissenting opinions. Neither former Justice Orrie Melvin nor newly appointed Justice Correale Stevens participated in the decision. The decision has three major thrusts. First, a majority—the plurality plus Justice Baer—reversed the lower court insofar as it upheld standing for all of the petitioners in the case. Second, the same majority rejected the argument that the case is precluded under the political question doctrine. Third, as already noted, it held three sections of Act 13 to be unconstitutional. We take these in turn below.

A. \textit{Majority: Standing}

The basic requirement for standing is that the petitioner or plaintiff must show that he or she has “a substantial, direct and immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation.”\footnote{Id. at 917 (majority opinion).} The State argued that most of the petitioners did not have standing. A majority of the court disagreed, and upheld standing for all of the petitioners.\footnote{State courts, of course, are free to adopt standing requirements that are different from those employed by federal courts. \textsc{Robert F. Williams, The Law of American State Constitutions} 289–99 (2009).} Two individuals—Brian Coppola and David Ball—asserted that Act 13 negatively affected them because they cannot enjoy their properties as expected or guarantee

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{28} Robinson Twp., 52 A.3d at 489.
\bibitem{29} Id. at 476–78.
\bibitem{30} Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 83 A.3d 901, 978 (Pa. 2013) (plurality opinion).
\bibitem{31} Id. at 917 (majority opinion).
\end{thebibliography}
enjoyment of these properties to potential buyers.\textsuperscript{33} The court held they had standing as individuals. They are also local government officials. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not decide whether they had a separate interest as local elected officials that would also confer standing.\textsuperscript{34}

Robinson Township and six other local governments asserted standing because Act 13 imposes substantial, direct, and immediate obligations on them that affect their governmental functions.\textsuperscript{35} The Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed, saying that protection of environmental and esthetic interests is an essential aspect of Pennsylvanians’ quality of life and a key part of local government’s role. In effect, the court said, Act 13 places them in position of either violating constitutional duties or violating Act 13.\textsuperscript{36}

Maya Van Rossum (the Delaware Riverkeeper) and the Delaware Riverkeeper Network submitted affidavits on record showing that individual members of the Delaware Riverkeeper Network were Pennsylvania residents as well as owners of property or business interests that were likely to suffer harm in the value of their existing homes and enjoyment of their properties because of Act 13.\textsuperscript{37} The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the Delaware Riverkeeper Network has standing because of injury alleged to its members.\textsuperscript{38} Because of her official position as executive director of this organization, the court held, Maya Van Rossum also has standing to represent the organization.\textsuperscript{39}

The court also upheld standing for Meherosh Khan, a physician who treats patients in areas where drilling operations are taking place.\textsuperscript{40} Dr. Khan alleged that Act 13’s restrictions on obtaining and sharing information with other physicians regarding chemicals used in drilling operations impede his ability to properly treat his patients.\textsuperscript{41} Act 13 allows a physician to get the identity of these chemicals from the industry, but then requires the physician to keep the identity of these chemicals confidential. Failure to do so subjects the physician to legal action for failure to protect trade secrets. Dr. Khan said this restriction forces him to choose between following Act 13 and adhering to his legal and ethical duties to report findings in medical records and make records

\textsuperscript{33} Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 918.
\textsuperscript{34} Id.
\textsuperscript{35} Id.
\textsuperscript{36} Id. at 920.
\textsuperscript{37} Id. at 922.
\textsuperscript{38} Id.
\textsuperscript{39} Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 922–23.
\textsuperscript{40} Id. at 924–25.
\textsuperscript{41} Id. at 923.
available to patients and other doctors. Because of what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court called his “unpalatable professional choices in the wake of Act 13,” his interest is substantial and direct.

B. Majority: Political Question

The State also argued that the claims presented against Act 13 should not be heard because they present a political question. The courts, the State argued, should not be in a position of revisiting or second guessing legislative choices. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, citing precedent that goes back to the early history of the United States, said that it had the power to decide whether legislative choices, including Act 13, are constitutional. It does not matter, the court said, that the legislative choices were made in a difficult political context; the question is whether they are constitutional and the courts have the ability to decide that.

C. Constitutionality of Act 13

1. Plurality: Article I, Section 27

The State argued that article I, section 27 “recognizes or confers no right upon citizens and no right or inherent obligation upon municipalities; rather, the constitutional provision exists only to guide the General Assembly, which alone determines what is best for public natural resources, and the environment generally, in Pennsylvania.” The commonwealth court’s decision on section 3303 of Act 13, which said

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42. Id. at 924.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 925.
45. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 925.
46. Id. at 927.
47. See also Williams, supra note 32, at 299; Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Political Question Doctrine in State Constitutional Law, 43 Rutgers L.J. 573, 590 (2013) (“If, as Marbury v. Madison teaches us, it is the duty of courts to say what the law is, the political question doctrine justifies abdication of responsibility. This is the classic objection to the doctrine and it is a point well taken in the state constitutional context as well.” (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803)). The Robinson Township court cited Marbury as part of its decision that the political question doctrine is inapplicable. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 929.
48. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 942 (plurality opinion).
in effect that legislation trumps article I, section 27, is consistent with the State’s position.

The three-justice plurality disagreed, finding section 27 to be self-executing and actionable. Indeed, a substantial part of its opinion sets out “foundational principles” about article I, section 27 to guide future courts and decision makers.

The plurality first concluded that article I, section 27 is self-executing—that it can be enforced by a court without implementing legislation. The plurality emphasized that the environmental amendment is located in article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which is Pennsylvania’s analogue to the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution. Article I is the same place where the right to free speech; the right to bear arms; and the right to acquire, possess, and protect property are located. Rights in article I, the plurality noted, are understood as inherent rights that are reserved to the people; they operate as limits on government power. The plurality then explained that, under Pennsylvania law, these rights are self-executing. This law includes prior case law under article I, section 27. If this were not the case, limits on governmental power that required an exercise of legislative power for their execution could easily be frustrated by the legislature’s refusal to do so. It is particularly appropriate to treat article I, section 27 as self-executing, the plurality said, because it provides “the court with a complete and enforceable rule . . . .” The plurality explained that the court had not previously had an opportunity to address how article I, section 27 restrains the exercise of governmental regulatory power, and therefore “has had no opportunity to address the original understanding of the constitutional provision . . . .”

Constitutional interpretation, the plurality wrote, must begin with the plain language of article I, section 27 itself. The first sentence establishes two rights in the people, Chief Justice Castille wrote. The

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50. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 956 (plurality opinion).
51. Id. at 964–65 n.52.
52. Article I, section 25, which was in the state constitution before section 27 was adopted, states: “To guard against transgressions of the high powers which we have delegated, we declare that everything in this article is excepted out of the general powers of government and shall forever remain inviolate.” PA. CONST. art. I, § 25 (emphasis added).
53. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 964 n.52, 974 (plurality opinion).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 964 n.52 (citing Jose L. Fernandez, State Constitutions, Environmental Rights Provisions, and the Doctrine of Self-Execution: A Political Question?, 17 HAYN. ENVTL. L. REV. 333, 333 (1993)).
56. Id. at 964.
first is a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values of the environment. The second is “a limitation on the state’s power to act contrary to this right.”

These rights bind the state as well as local governments, the plurality said. In addition, these rights are equal in status and enforceability to any other rights included in the state constitution, including property rights.

The second and third sentences, the plurality wrote, involve a public trust. Public natural resources are owned in common by the people, including future generations. Because the state is the trustee of these resources, it has a fiduciary duty to conserve and maintain them. The plain meaning of the terms conserve and maintain implicates a duty to prevent and remedy the degradation, diminution, or depletion of our public natural resources.

The state has two separate obligations as trustee. The first is “a duty to refrain from permitting or encouraging the degradation, diminution, or depletion of public natural resources . . . .” The second is a duty “to act affirmatively to protect the environment, via legislative action.” These duties, the plurality said, foster “legitimate development tending to improve upon the lot of Pennsylvania’s citizenry, with the evident goal of promoting sustainable development.”

Pennsylvania’s history, Chief Justice Castille wrote, includes massive deforestation, the loss of game, and industrialization and coal mining. “It is not a historical accident that the Pennsylvania Constitution now places citizens’ environmental rights on par with their political rights,” the plurality wrote. Ambiguous constitutional provisions, he pointed out, are to be interpreted based on “the mischief to be remedied” and “the object to be attained.”

In light of this analysis, the plurality concluded, the “non-textual” balancing test in Payne v. Kassab “is inappropriate to determine matters outside the narrowest category of cases, i.e., those cases in which a challenge is premised simply upon an alleged failure to comply with statutory standards enacted to advance section 27 interests.”

The plurality then applied this framework to sections 3303, 3304, and 3215(b)(4):

57. Id. at 951.
58. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
59. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 957 (plurality opinion).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 958.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 960.
64. Id. at 945.
65. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 967 (plurality opinion).
• Section 3303, which preempted local regulation of oil and gas operations, violates article I, section 27 because “the General Assembly has no authority to remove a political subdivision's implicitly necessary authority to carry into effect its constitutional duties.” The Commonwealth is the trustee under the Amendment, which means that local governments are among the trustees with constitutional responsibilities.

• Section 3304, which requires “all local ordinances” to “allow for the reasonable development of oil and gas resources” and imposes uniform rules for oil and gas regulation, violates article I, section 27 for two reasons. “First, a new regulatory regime permitting industrial uses as a matter of right in every type of pre-existing zoning district [including residential] is incapable of conserving or maintaining the constitutionally-protected aspects of the public environment and of a certain quality of life.” Second, under Act 13 “some properties and communities will carry much heavier environmental and habitability burdens than others.” This result is inconsistent with the obligation that the trustee act for the benefit of “all the people.”

• Section 3215(b)(4), which requires DEP to waive setback distances to protect streams and other water bodies, violates article I, section 27 for three reasons. First, the legislation “does not provide any ascertainable standards by which public natural resources are to be protected if an oil and gas operator seeks a waiver.” Second, “[i]f an applicant appeals permit terms or conditions . . . section 3215 remarkably places the burden on [DEP] to 'prov[е] that the conditions were necessary to protect against a probable harmful impact of [sic] the public resources.'” Third, because section 3215 prevents anyone other than the applicant from appealing a permit condition, it “marginalizes

66. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3303 (West 2014).
67. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 977 (plurality opinion); see also Kathleen S. Morris, The Case for Local Constitutional Enforcement, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2012) (arguing that local governments should have the ability to enforce constitutional rights).
68. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3304.
69. Id. at 979.
70. Id. at 980.
71. Id. (quoting PA. CONST. art I, § 27).
72. 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3215(b)(4).
73. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 983 (plurality opinion).
74. Id. at 984 (alterations in original) (quoting 58 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3215(e)(2)).
participation by residents, business owners, and their elected representatives with environmental and habitability concerns, whose interests section 3215 ostensibly protects.”

2. Concurring Opinion: Substantive Due Process

In his concurring opinion, Justice Baer saw the primary argument of the petitioners to be based on substantive due process, and also viewed that approach as “better developed and a narrower avenue to resolve this appeal.” In “a state as large and diverse as Pennsylvania, meaningful protection of the acknowledged substantive due process right of an adjoining landowner to quiet enjoyment of his real property can only be carried out at the local level.” The challenged provisions, he said, “force municipalities to enact zoning ordinances [that] violate the substantive due process rights of their citizenries.”

3. Dissenting Opinions

Justice Saylor, in his dissenting opinion, took issue with the plurality and concurring opinions. In his view, Act 13 provides a detailed system for regulating unconventional gas development. The legislature “occupies the primary fiduciary role” under article I, section 27, and local governments have no “vested entitlement” to “dictate the manner in which the General Assembly administers the Commonwealth’s fiduciary obligation to the citizenry at large relative to the environment.” Justice Eakin’s dissent expressed concern that the decision empowers municipalities at the expense of state decision-making authority.

III. IMPACTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF ROBINSON TOWNSHIP

The most obvious impact of the Robinson Township decision is to force lawyers and decision makers to look anew at the text of article I, section 27, and to recognize it as constitutional law. The decision also raises a wide variety of specific questions. Two of the most important are the impact of the opinion on municipal decision-making and the

75. Id.
76. Id. at 1001 (Baer, J., concurring).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1008.
79. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 1012 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1015 (Eakin, J., dissenting).
likelihood that article I, section 27 will be used again to challenge the constitutionality of another statute. In addition, the decision will likely be read carefully by courts and other decision makers in other states and countries that have embraced environmental constitutionalism.

A. Revitalizing the Environmental Rights Amendment

Robinson Township has major consequences for article I, section 27. The revitalization of article I, section 27 may be of greater import than its effect on Marcellus Shale development, even though it did not command the votes of a majority. The plurality treated article I, section 27 as actual constitutional law. It also reinforces environmental constitutionalism insofar as it represents an authentic attempt to engage the text of the Environmental Rights Amendment. No Pennsylvania court had yet articulated the “foundational principles” of article I, section 27 in this way, or at this level of detail. In addition, no Pennsylvania court had previously used article I, section 27 as a justification for holding a statute unconstitutional. In so doing, the court provided a framework for understanding and applying the Amendment that will likely be considered for decades.

The plurality clarified the meaning of article I, section 27 by recognizing that it contains two distinct sets of rules. The first is a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic values of the environment. The second involves a public trust in public natural resources, which the state is to conserve and maintain for the benefit of present and future generations. The plurality also articulated for the first time what limits each of these rules imposes on the state—limitations that were described above.

The plurality's approach also refocused the role of balancing in environmental constitutionalism. Specifically, the plurality rejected the “non-textual” balancing test in Payne v. Kassab as “inappropriate” to determine matters outside a narrow category of cases. Its criticism of the Payne test suggests that, even in those cases, courts will use the constitutional text as a point of reference.

Last, the plurality in Robinson Township made a point of explaining that environmental rights provisions serve both present and future generations. It observed: “By any responsible account, the exploitation of the Marcellus Shale Formation will produce a detrimental effect on the

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82. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 (first sentence).
83. Id. (second and third sentences).
84. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 967 (plurality opinion).
environment, on the people, their children, and future generations, and potentially on the public purse, perhaps rivaling the environmental effects of coal extraction.” While some contest the comparison of shale gas with coal, there is a larger point here. The plurality opinion advances the purpose of constitutional enshrinement of environmental rights and public trust duties in the first place—to promote environmental protection and advance individual rights to a quality environment for both present and future generations.

B. Immediate Consequences in Pennsylvania

This case has a wide range of implications. We discuss here only two of the most immediate implications—how it will affect decision-making by municipalities, and the likelihood that the text of article I, section 27 will again be used to challenge the constitutionality of a statute.

1. Decision-making by Municipalities

A likely focus of both immediate and longer-term analyses of the Robinson Township decision is the effect it will have on Pennsylvania municipalities. On one level, the decision represents a victory for municipalities because it identifies limits on the General Assembly’s ability to interfere with local regulation. In recognizing that the municipal petitioners had standing, the majority stated:

This Court has held that a political subdivision has a substantial, direct, and immediate interest in protecting the environment and the quality of life within its borders, which interest confers upon the political subdivision standing in a legal action to enforce environmental standards. Political subdivisions, the Court has recognized, are legal persons, which have the right and indeed the duty to seek judicial relief, and, more importantly, they are “place[s] populated by people.” The protection of environmental and esthetic interests is an essential aspect of Pennsylvanians’ quality of life and a key part of local government’s role. Local government, therefore, has a substantial and direct interest in the outcome of litigation premised upon changes, or serious and imminent risk of changes, which would alter the physical nature of

85. Id.
the political subdivision and of various components of the environment.\textsuperscript{86}

Because this municipal interest in protecting environmental, esthetic, and quality of life issues is “a quintessential local issue that must be tailored to local conditions,”\textsuperscript{87} the plurality found that Act 13’s “one size fits all” approach impermissibly displaced local development guidelines and “effectively disposed of the regulatory structures upon which citizens and communities made significant financial and quality of life decisions, and has sanctioned a direct and harmful degradation of the environmental quality of life in these communities and zoning districts.”\textsuperscript{88} While “the General Assembly has the authority to alter or remove any powers granted and obligations imposed by statute upon municipalities . . . constitutional commands regarding municipalities’ obligations and duties to their citizens cannot be abrogated by statute.”\textsuperscript{89} Put differently, “the General Assembly has no authority to remove a political subdivision’s implicitly necessary authority to carry into effect its constitutional duties.”\textsuperscript{90} In his concurring opinion, Justice Baer makes essentially the same point:

\begin{quote}
[M]andating to municipalities that they enact land use and zoning ordinances in compliance with the ineffective, yet absolute, “protections” afforded within Act 13, without any available mechanism for objection or remedy by the citizenry consistent with the individualized concerns of each municipality, zoning district, or resident, is the epitome of arbitrary and discriminatory impact.\textsuperscript{91}
\end{quote}

Thus, whether under the guise of the plurality’s view of article I, section 27 or Justice Baer’s view of substantive due process, municipalities enjoy some constitutional protection against the General Assembly’s overreach.

What is more likely to draw immediate attention, however, is language suggesting that municipalities have responsibilities that they may not have recognized or fully appreciated before the decision. In discussing standing, for example, the plurality states that “[t]he aggrievement alleged by the political subdivisions is not limited to vindication of individual citizens’ rights but extends to allegations that

\begin{flushright}
86. \textit{Id.} at 919–20 (majority opinion) (citations omitted).
87. \textit{Id.} at 979 (plurality opinion).
88. \textit{Id.} at 980.
89. \textit{Id.} at 977.
90. \textit{Robinson Twp.}, 83 A.3d at 977 (plurality opinion).
91. \textit{Id.} at 1007 (Baer, J., concurring).
\end{flushright}
the challenged statute interferes with the subdivisions’ constitutional duties respecting the environment and, therefore, its interests and functions as a governing entity.”

This notion that political subdivisions have “constitutional duties respecting the environment” gets further amplified by the plurality’s multiple assertions that article I, section 27 imposes a constitutional obligation on local governments. Indeed, the plurality declares the limits of the General Assembly’s ability to grant or withdraw municipal powers in terms of “constitutional commands regarding municipalities’ obligations and duties to . . . citizens.” Thus, the plurality decision in Robinson Township affirmatively states that municipalities share in the constitutional obligations imposed by article I, section 27, and therefore the affirmative obligations imposed on the Commonwealth at the state level are imposed at the local level as well.

Recognition of such constitutional obligations at the local level means that article I, section 27 challenges to local actions (such as zoning or other ordinances) or non-actions (such as the failure to have zoning or other ordinances) are theoretically possible. Such challenges would at the very least impose defense burdens on municipalities. Robinson Township provides some guidance on how such challenges can and should be resolved.

First, the plurality articulated two basic categories of claims under article I, section 27: “A legal challenge pursuant to section 27 may proceed upon alternate theories that either the government has infringed upon citizens’ rights or the government has failed in its trustee obligations, or upon both theories.”

The first of these categories (“rights claims”) suggests a governmental action resulting in an infringement of a citizen’s right under section 27—

92. Id. at 920 (plurality opinion).

93. Id.

94. See, e.g., id. at 952 (“Moreover . . . the constitutional obligation binds all government, state or local, concurrently. Franklin Twp., 452 A.2d at 722 & n.8 (citing [section 27, [court stated that protection and enhancement of citizens’ quality of life ‘is a constitutional charge which must be respected by all levels of government in the Commonwealth’ . . . .’]); id. at 956–57 (‘The plain intent of the [third clause of article I, section 27] is to permit the checks and balances of government to operate in their usual fashion for the benefit of the people in order to accomplish the purposes of the trust. This includes local government.’); id. at 977 (“With respect to the public trust, article I, section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution names not the General Assembly but ‘the Commonwealth’ as trustee. We have explained that, as a result, all existing branches and levels of government derive constitutional duties and obligations with respect to the people.”); id. at 978 (“Act 13 thus commands municipalities to ignore their obligations under article I, section 27 . . . .”).

95. Id. at 977.

96. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 950 (plurality opinion).
“the . . . ‘right’ . . . to clean air and pure water, and to the preservation of
natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment”97—
contained in the first clause of section 27. The implication from the
plurality’s analysis is that the notion of an “infringement” of these rights
arises from government action and not from inaction:

This clause affirms a limitation on the state’s power to act
counter to this right. . .

. . . [T]he first clause of section 27 does not impose express duties
on the political branches to enact specific affirmative measures to
promote clean air, pure water, and the preservation of the
different values of our environment.98

Thus, a failure to act likely falls outside this first category of claims.
The second category of claims (“trust claims”) could arise from either
an action or a failure to act because of its trust law roots.99 However,
trust claims must be rooted in the public trust principles imposed by the
second and third sentences of section 27. The plurality made it clear that
“[o]n its terms, the second clause of section 27

100

The drafters, however, left unqualified the phrase public natural
resources, suggesting that the term fairly implicates relatively

97. Id. at 951.
98. Id. at 951–52. In this way, the first sentence in article I, section 27 contains a
“negative right” but not a “positive right.” See generally ZACKIN, supra note 4
(distinguishing between positive and negative rights in constitutions, and advocating
greater use of positive rights in state constitutions). According to Zackin:
[A] negative right protects its bearers from governmental threats by serving as the
basis for a demand that government restrain itself. Similarly, a positive right
protects its bearers even from non-governmental threats by serving as the basis for
a demand that government intervene to protect and/or aid the threatened rights
bearer.

Id. at 41. The first sentence contains a negative right because it limits government
power to act contrary to the rights that it states.
99. See Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 955–56 (plurality opinion) (indicating that the
public trust concept in the third clause of section 27 establishes duties “which are both
negative (i.e., prohibitory) and affirmative (i.e., implicating enactment of legislation and
regulations”).
100. Id. at 955.
broad aspects of the environment, and is amenable to change over time to conform, for example, with the development of related legal and societal concerns. At present, the concept of public natural resources includes not only state-owned lands, waterways, and mineral reserves, but also resources that implicate the public interest, such as ambient air, surface and ground water, wild flora, and fauna (including fish) that are outside the scope of purely private property.\(^\text{101}\)

Nevertheless, the notion of a public interest implication arguably limits claims that are about private property unless a connection to “public natural resources” can be shown.

The express duty in section 27 is to “conserve and maintain” the public resources that form the corpus of the trust. As noted earlier, for the plurality, this creates three obligations:

1. “a duty to refrain from permitting or encouraging the degradation, diminution, or depletion of public natural resources, whether such degradation, diminution, or depletion would occur through direct state action or indirectly, e.g., because of the state’s failure to restrain the actions of private parties”\(^\text{102}\);
2. a duty to “act affirmatively to protect the environment, via legislative action”\(^\text{103}\) and
3. a duty “to deal impartially with all beneficiaries” by “balanc[ing] the interests of present and future beneficiaries.”\(^\text{104}\)

The precise contours of these three obligations are not explained, and therefore left to future judicial interpretation. Nevertheless, the plurality seems to recognize at least two countervailing principles that may mitigate the impact of these obligations on municipalities. First, the plurality makes clear that

\(^{101}\) \textit{Id.} (citation omitted).

\(^{102}\) \textit{Id.} at 957.

\(^{103}\) \textit{Id.} at 958.

\(^{104}\) \textit{Id.} at 959. These three public trust obligations are in the form of both positive and negative rights. See ZACKIN, supra note 4, at 41. The first of these three obligations is primarily a negative right—a right to prevent the government from damaging public natural resources. The last two obligations are primarily affirmative rights—requiring the government to administer the constitutional public trust in specific ways. To the extent that the constitutional public trust involves state-owned property, however, the distinction disappears because “state action and restraint are really two sides of the same coin.” \textit{Id.} at 172. That is, a right to limit the state in its use of public natural resources is also a right to require the state to conserve and maintain those resources.
the trust’s express directions to conserve and maintain public natural resources do not require a freeze of the existing public natural resource stock; rather, as with the rights affirmed by the first clause of section 27, the duties to conserve and maintain are tempered by legitimate development tending to improve upon the lot of Pennsylvania’s citizenry, with the evident goal of promoting sustainable development.105

Thus, legitimate development designed to improve the general welfare that amounts to sustainable development would not violate the plurality’s view of the trust obligations imposed on municipalities under article I, section 27.

Second, both the plurality and Justice Baer’s concurrence recognize and place importance on what the plurality termed “regulatory structures upon which citizens and communities made significant financial and quality of life decisions.”106 For Justice Baer, these regulatory structures “vindicate” a substantive due process right in the neighboring landowner.107 Zoning (or, presumably, other local regulation springing from the police power) which bears “a substantial relationship to the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the community” is constitutionally permissible.108 Thus, local regulatory structures may enjoy some protection from claims under article I, section 27. How the police power and public trust obligations interrelate will likely be the context in which challenges to municipal actions and non-actions play out in the near future after Robinson Township.

2. Challenge to Constitutionality of Statutes

The Robinson Township decision was based on a facial constitutional challenge to Act 13, and the grounds for the decision were divided between article I, section 27 and substantive due process. An immediate next step for the development of article I, section 27 jurisprudence could be a majority decision determining the validity of a statute (or regulation or ordinance) based on the text of the environmental amendment.

105. Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 958 (plurality opinion).
106. Id. at 980.
107. See id. at 1002–03 (Baer, J., concurring) (“May the General Assembly, through a law applicable statewide, remove en toto from local municipalities the apparatus it provided to vindicate the individual substantive due process rights of Pennsylvanian landowners?”).
108. Id. at 1003.
The plurality opinion, of course, provides much of the basis for this conclusion. But so do inherent limitations in the three-part Payne v. Kassab test,\textsuperscript{109} which is utterly inappropriate for determining the constitutionality of a statute. A constitutional challenge to a statute—whether a facial challenge like the one in this case or a challenge to a statute as applied—obviously requires the use of a constitutional rule. The Payne v. Kassab test, however, does not provide such a rule. The first prong of the test is: “Was there compliance with all applicable statutes and regulations relevant to the protection of the Commonwealth’s public natural resources?”\textsuperscript{110} This prong is about compliance with statutes and regulations, and provides no means for determining the constitutionality of the statute(s) being implemented. The second prong is: “Does the record demonstrate a reasonable effort to reduce the environmental incursion to a minimum?”\textsuperscript{111} This prong is about reducing environmental harm, but once again does not provide a standard for determining the constitutionality of a statute.

The third prong is: “Does the environmental harm which will result from the challenged decision or action so clearly outweigh the benefits to be derived therefrom that to proceed further would be an abuse of discretion?”\textsuperscript{112} This prong presupposes that the standard of review is an “arbitrary and capricious” test, not a constitutional test. As administrative lawyers well know, the “arbitrary and capricious” test is applied to decisions that are within the statutory or regulatory authority of the administrative agency or local government that made the decision, but are considered to be an abuse of discretion. A claim that a statute is unconstitutional, by contrast, is directed against the authority of the legislature, and is not based on an “arbitrary and capricious” test. It thus seems likely that a future court will use the text of article I, section 27 to determine the constitutionality of a statute, ordinance, or administrative regulation.

C. Influencing Constitutional Environmental Rights Elsewhere

Robinson Township is likely to influence environmental constitutionalism in the United States and around the globe. Environmental constitutionalism is a relatively recent phenomenon at the confluence of constitutional law, international law, human rights, and

\textsuperscript{109} See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Id}.
\textsuperscript{112} \textit{Id}.
and environmental law. It embodies the recognition that the environment is a proper subject for protection in constitutional texts and for vindication by constitutional courts worldwide.\footnote{See generally James R. May & Erin Daly, Global Constitutional Environmental Rights, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 603 (Shawkat Alam, et al. eds., 2012); James R. May, Constituting Fundamental Environmental Rights Worldwide, 23 PAC ENVTL. L. REV. 113, 113 (2006); James R. May & Erin Daly, Constitutional Environmental Rights Worldwide, in PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 329 (2011); James R. May & Erin Daly, New Directions in Earth Rights, Environmental Rights and Human Rights: Six Facets of Constitutionally Embedded Environmental Rights Worldwide, IUCN ACAD. ENVTL. L. E-J. 1, 1 (2011); James R. May & Erin Daly, Vindicating Fundamental Environmental Rights Worldwide, 11 OR. REV. ENVTL. L. 365, 366 (2009) [hereinafter May & Daly, Vindicating Fundamental Environmental Rights Worldwide].}

Environmental constitutionalism is evolving globally and subnationally. The constitutions of approximately three-quarters of nations worldwide address environmental matters in some fashion: some by committing to environmental stewardship; others by recognizing a basic right to a quality environment; and still others by ensuring a right to information, participation, and justice in environmental matters.\footnote{May & Daly, supra note 4, at 209–35.} Indeed, most people on Earth now live under constitutions that protect environmental rights in some way. And environmental constitutionalism continues to emerge and evolve in courts all around the globe, although many constitutionally-embedded environmental rights provisions have yet to be energetically engaged. Courts and lawyers in other states and countries are likely to look to the Robinson Township decision for guidance and ideas.

1. Subnational Environmental Constitutionalism

Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights Amendment is unique but not alone. While all efforts to amend the United States Constitution to recognize environmental rights have failed,\footnote{See generally Robin Kundis Craig, Should There Be a Constitutional Right to a Clean/Healthy Environment?, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 11013, 11014 (2004).} states in the United States have a long tradition of constitutionalizing environmental protection. Indeed, constitutional recognition of natural resources and the environment at the subnational level in the United States harkens back almost two centuries, beginning in 1842 with Rhode Island’s protection of “all the rights of fishery, and the privileges of the shore.”\footnote{R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. I, § 17. For a thorough history of the evolution of the Rhode Island Constitution, see Kevin Leitao, Rhode Island’s Forgotten Bill of Rights, 1 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 31, 58 n.68 (1996).} Among the
more notable provisions is the “Wildlands Forever” provision of the New York State Constitution, which provides:

The lands of the state, now owned or hereafter acquired, constituting the forest preserve as now fixed by law, shall be forever kept as wild forest lands. They shall not be leased, sold or exchanged, or be taken by any corporation, public or private, nor shall the timber thereon be sold, removed or destroyed.  

There are at least 207 natural resource or environment-related provisions in forty-six state constitutions. These provisions reach nineteen different categories of natural resources or the environment, including water, timber, and minerals. They also take eleven different forms, including general policy statements, legislative directives, and individual rights to a quality environment. States recognizing environmental protection as an overarching state policy include Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, South Carolina, and Virginia.

117. N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; see, e.g., Ass’n for the Prot. of the Adirondacks v. MacDonald, 170 N.E. 902, 903 (1930) (finding timber harvesting inconsistent with “Forever Wild” portion of the New York state constitution).

118. May & Romanowicz, supra note 4, at 305.

119. Environmental and Natural Resources Provisions in State Constitutions, 22 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 74 (2002). The categories are: (1) public land acquisition, preservation, or management, (2) public ownership of land and other resources, (3) sovereignty, (4) the balance of use and development, (5) school trust doctrine, (6) public trust doctrine, (7) takings or eminent domain, (8) access to water, (9) allocation of water, (10) water development and reclamation, (11) water resource protection, (12) mining and mineral rights, (13) fish and wildlife, (14) fishing rights, (15) hunting and fishing restrictions, (16) rights of way, (17) timber and forest management, (18) nuclear power, and (19) agriculture. Id. at 74–75.

120. Id. at 75. The other manifestations include provisions respecting (1) legislative protection, (2) agency authority, (3) general financing, (4) taxing authority, (5) bonding authority, (6) funds and trust accounts, (7) educational programs, and (8) private liability. Id.

121. LA. CONST. art. IX, § 1 (“The natural resources of the state, including air and water, and the healthful, scenic, historic, and esthetic quality of the environment shall be protected, conserved, and replenished insofar as possible and consistent with the health, safety, and welfare of the people. The legislature shall enact laws to implement this policy.”).

122. MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 51 (“The legislature shall pass suitable laws for the protection and promotion of the public health.”).

123. OHIO CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (“[E]nvironmental and related conservation, preservation, and revitalization purposes . . . are proper public purposes of the state and local governmental entities and are necessary and appropriate means to improve the quality of life and the general and economic well-being of the people of this state . . . .”).
Several more address parochial environmental concerns, such as access to water, preservation, re-development, sustainability, pollution abatement, climate change, energy reform, or environmental rights. Dozens more contain provisions fairly characterized as recognizing that the state holds state resources in “public trust.”

In addition to Pennsylvania, states that have instantiated a substantive right to a quality environment include Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Montana. These provisions are independent of state laws that allow citizens to enforce pollution control statutes.

No state provision is the same as Pennsylvania’s Environmental Rights Amendment. While most provide a “right” to the “environment,” the adjectival objective—“clean” or “healthful” or “quality”—differs from state to state. For example, Hawaii’s and Montana’s constitutions aim to afford a “clean and healthful environment,” Illinois’ “a right to a

124. S.C. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (“The health, welfare, and safety of the lives and property of the people of this State and the conservation of its natural resources are matters of public concern.”).

125. VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (“To the end that the people have clean air, pure water, and the use and enjoyment for recreation of adequate public lands, waters, and other natural resources, . . . it shall be the Commonwealth’s policy to protect its atmosphere, lands, and waters from pollution, impairment, or destruction, for the benefit, enjoyment, and general welfare of the people of the Commonwealth.”).

126. Of course, whether to categorize a constitutional provision as addressing the environment or resources involves some measure of subjectivity.

127. May and Romanowicz, supra note 4, at 305.

128. See Mary Ellen Cusack, Judicial Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights to a Healthful Environment, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 173, 181 (1993) (noting amendments to state constitutions include “those granting citizens the right to a healthful environment; public policy statements concerning preservation of natural resources; financial provisions for environmental programs; and clauses that restrict the environmental prerogatives of state legislatures”); see also EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 416 (1998) (identifying Illinois, Hawaii, California, Florida, Massachusetts, Montana, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Virginia as embedding environmental rights).

129. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9.

130. ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2.

131. MASS. CONST. art. XLIX.

132. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3.

133. Many state environmental statutes, for example, have citizen suit provisions. See, e.g., Air Pollution Control Act, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4013.6(c) (West 2014) (authorizing citizen suits to compel compliance with Act).

134. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9 (“Each person has the right to a clean and healthful environment . . . .”); MONT. CONST. art. II, § 3 (guaranteeing “the right to a clean and healthful environment”).
healthful environment,” and Massachusetts’ a “right to clean air and water, freedom from excessive and unnecessary noise, and the natural, scenic, historic, and esthetic qualities of their environment.”

2. Global Environmental Constitutionalism

Nearly one-half of countries worldwide have constitutions that include substantive environmental rights like those advanced in Robinson Township. Substantive environmental rights are those that recognize a right to some degree of environmental quality, such as a right to an “adequate,” “clean,” “healthy,” “productive,” “harmonious,” or “sustainable” environment. Moreover, environmental rights have been recognized as a component of non-environmental substantive rights, such as the right to life. Since 2000, about two dozen countries have adopted new or amended substantive environmental rights provisions in their constitutions, including Armenia, Bolivia, Ecuador, the Dominican Republic, France, Guinea, Hungary, Jamaica, Kenya, Maldives, Madagascar, Montenegro, Myanmar, Nepal, Rwanda, Serbia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Turkmenistan. Environmental constitutionalism is also under consideration in at least half a dozen other countries.

3. Judicial Receptivity to Constitutional Environmental Rights

More and more courts around the globe are engaging in environmental constitutionalism, seriously interpreting and applying environmental provisions in the constitutions of their jurisdiction. Hence, courts from around the globe are likely to turn to Robinson Township for guidance.

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135.  Ill. Const. art. XI, § 2 ("Each person has the right to a healthful environment.").
136.  Mass. Const. art. XLIX ("The people shall have the right to clean air and water.").
139.  May & Daly, supra note 4, at 65. Appendices A–C contain a complete list of countries with such provisions, regardless of when they were adopted. Id.
140.  Id.
A constitutionally enshrined right to a quality environment is most effective when it is recognized and enforced judicially. Nonetheless, constitutionally-embedded environmental provisions are seldom subject to substantive interpretation, leaving them dormant and awaiting clarity through advocacy. This dearth in applicable jurisprudence is likely due to judicial concerns about recognizing and enforcing emerging constitutional features, restraining economic development and property rights, entering what are often seen as political thicketes, or providing causes of action that may displace other legislative prerogatives granted to affected persons, such as state citizen suits to enforce state pollution control requirements.

Principally, constitutional environmental rights—including those at the subnational level in the United States—are under enforced because they are not designed or deemed to be self-executing. The environmental rights provisions embedded in Hawaii’s and Illinois’ constitutions, for example, are enforceable by “any person . . . through appropriate legal proceedings, subject to reasonable limitations and regulation as provided by law.” Massachusetts’ environmental rights provision seems to assume judicial action without requiring intervening legislative action. Moreover, some provisions contain a parallel provision that imposes a duty upon the state to enact laws to protect the environment, which suggests to some that corresponding environmental rights provisions are not self-executing. Some see the mandatory “shall” as requiring legislative action to effectuate constitutional environmental rights. Others see these provisions as merely invoking “moral force” that does

141. For a general discussion of enforcement in this context, see John C. Tucker, Constitutional Codification of an Environmental Ethic, 52 FLA. L. REV. 299 (2000).

142. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Dep’t of Transp., 167 P.3d 292, 313 n.28 (Haw. 2007) (explaining that “[a]lthough this court has cited this amendment as support for our approach to standing in environmental cases . . . we have not directly interpreted the text of the amendment”).


144. The obstacles to enforcing state constitutional environmental rights are strikingly similar to those that afflict enforcement of environmental rights provisions in national constitutions worldwide. See generally May & Daly, Vindicating Fundamental Environmental Rights Worldwide, supra note 113.


146. HAW. CONST. art. XI, § 9; ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 2. But see Cusack, supra note 128, at 182 (opining that Hawaii’s provision is self-executing).

147. MASS. CONST. art. XCIVII (“The general court shall have the power to enact legislation necessary or expedient to protect such rights.”).
not create a separately enforceable environmental right. Most state
court decisions in the United States have found constitutionally-
embedded provisions in state constitutions not to be self-enforcing. For
example, in Enos v. Secretary of Environmental Affairs, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the constitutional right to
clean air and water does not afford an independent means to challenge
an agency’s decision to grant a permit to operate a sewage treatment
plant under the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act.

The plurality’s opinion in Robinson Township, however, opens the
door to fresh interpretations of constitutionally-embedded environmental
rights provisions, especially those found to be “on par” with other
constitutional rights. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is not alone in
engaging constitutional environmental rights. The Supreme Court of
Alaska recently read that state’s “public interest” constitutional standard
for resource development to require that courts take a hard look at
whether state agencies adequately considered the cumulative
environmental impacts of oil and gas leases. And the Supreme Court of
Montana has subjected that state’s environmental rights provision to
strict scrutiny, although it has since been reluctant to enforce it.

Robinson Township suggests a trend toward acceptance of environmental
constitutionalism in Pennsylvania and elsewhere. Robinson Township
thus reinforces the potential sway of environmental constitutionalism for
achieving the dual goals of advancing human rights and environmental
protection at national and subsidiary levels.

IV. CONCLUSION

Robinson Township is a potentially important corrective to judicial
under-engagement of environmental constitutionalism. Within
Pennsylvania, the case forces lawyers and decision makers to closely
examine the text of article I, section 27 and treat it as constitutional law.
It is particularly noteworthy that the decision was issued in the context
of a significant social, economic, and environmental controversy—

149. 731 N.E.2d 525 (Mass. 2000).
150. Id. at 532.
Marcellus Shale development. The plurality opinion is also a powerful vindication of constitutional environmentalism and may represent a significant step forward for American constitutional environmental rights in particular. The case may have far-reaching implications in other states and countries. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court attended to almost every significant issue that courts around the world are reckoning with, including standing, self-execution, interpretation of constitutional provisions, the public trust doctrine, and enforcement of constitutional environmental provisions. And it has done so in a way that takes seriously the environmental rights of the general public and of future generations. It is likely that other courts within and outside Pennsylvania will take notice, even though these views did not command a majority of the Pennsylvania court.